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  i 
Abstract  
Northern Uganda has been ravaged by violent conflict between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) for more than 20 years. The consequences of the conflict have been far-reaching 
and include destabilisation of the region, the displacement of up to 1.8 million people, the killing and mutilation 
of tens of thousands of civilians, and the abduction of even more civilians, mainly children, for recruitment in the 
LRA forces. Many years of failing attempts to put and end to the conflict and the miseries of the Ugandan 
population have finally paid off in recent years with a series of peace building initiatives that have brought rela-
tive stability to the region.  
  
Peace and conflict resolution scholars often argue that long-term reconciliation and lasting peace are best achieved 
through the pursuit of justice. This project examines to what extent the pursuit of justice has been addressed in 
the GoU’s peace building efforts. While transitional justice often is addressed in post-conflict contexts, Uganda 
is an interesting example of how transitional justice can be addressed in a situation of ongoing conflict. The pro-
ject, consequently, scrutinizes the dilemmas of pursuing justice in the context of ongoing conflict by applying a 
comprehensive theoretical framework of transitional justice situated within a framework of peace and conflict 
resolution theory. The analytical focus of the project is the GoU’s referral of the situation in Northern Uganda 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2003 and the subsequent arrest warrants in 2005, as well as 
the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation of 29 June 2007 and the Agreement on Comprehensive 
Solutions of 2 May 2007 signed during the Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008). 
 
In this project it is argued that the GoU’s comprehensive approach to transitional justice in its peace building ef-
forts can potentially lead to national reconciliation and lasting peace. The transitional justice processes, as initi-
ated by the GoU’s in its efforts to restore peace, however, face severe obstacles that truly risk compromising the 
peace process, including: 1) the failure of the ICC and the national judicial system to prosecute the alleged perpe-
trators from both parties to the conflict; 2) the failure of the GoU to support and legitimise the traditional justice 
mechanisms; 3) the failure of the GoU to recognise the suffering of the victims through truth telling mechanisms 
and reparations; and 4) the failure to address the socio-economic marginalization and political disempowerment 
of Northern Uganda, which constitute the main root causes of the conflict. While Northern Uganda is currently 
experiencing relatively stability, these factors severely risk compromising the unique opportunity to move towards 
peace.   
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1. Introduction  
“It was around 9 pm. I wanted to boil some groundnuts for my son and went to look for some firewood. 
Out in the bush I ran into one soldier. He the UPDF soldier got me and took me behind the camp 
and raped me. He threatened me with the gun. I told him that I didn’t want to and he replied that if I 
refused he would shoot me. I stopped fighting and he raped me.”1 
 
“The five LRA fighters told the woman they wanted the baby - they were going to kill it. After some 
minutes the woman threw the baby down and ran. The rebels grabbed the woman and beat her to death 
with a gun. When the woman was killed one rebel got a stick and pierced through the child’s head. The 
child was two weeks old.”2 
 
“It was around 7.30 in the morning when I was abducted together with my mother. We only moved a 
short distance away and I was then asked to kill my mother. I first refused but I was told my mother 
will be asked to kill me. They the LRA soldiers kept insisting. They tried to force my mother to kill 
me, but she would not. They said they would kill both of us, but my mother said I must kill her to sur-
vive. I did, but I loved my mother. I wanted both of us to die.”3  
 
These are just a few accounts of the horrific actions that have characterised the more than 20 
years of conflict in Northern Uganda in what has been described as “the biggest forgotten, neglected 
humanitarian emergency in the world today.”4 What started as an anti-government insurgency, when 
President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Army (NRA, the now UPDF) seized 
power in a military coup in January 1986 and effectively removed ethnic Acholi from military 
and political positions now appears to have turned into a war waged by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) against the people it initially claimed to protect, while its political message appears 
to have vanished.5 Known for its extreme brutality, the LRA under the leadership of Joseph 
Kony has killed and mutilated countless civilians. To fill its ranks, due to a general lack of 
popular support, the LRA has abducted tens of thousands of adults and children to serve in 
their forces, and young girls are abducted to serve as “wives” of the soldiers in what resembles 
sexual slavery.6  
                                               
1 Quote from Human Rights Watch interview with victim in Pabbo camp in Gulu in Northern Uganda on 25 
February 2005. (HRW 2005:34) 
2 Quote from Human Rights Watch interview with victims in Kitgum in Northern Uganda on 3 March 2005. 
(Ibid.:16) 
3 A young woman’s explanation on why she killed her mother in an interview conducted by Tim Allen. (Allen 
2006:67) 
4 These were the words of former UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 
Coordinator Jan Egeland (2003-2006) quoted in Forced Migration Review, December 2008. (Mukwana & Ridder-
bos 2008:21) 
5 Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:26 
6 HRW 2005:15-16 
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The consequences of the conflict have been far-reaching. Tens of thousands of people have 
been killed or maimed7, an estimated 54,000-75,000 people have been abducted by the LRA as 
part of their forces conscription strategy8, and at the height of the conflict an estimated 1,8 
million people9 were crowded into camps for internally displaced people (IDP camps) living in 
dismal conditions with rates of morbidity and mortality among the highest in the world.10 In 
addition to the threat of sporadic attacks and abductions by the LRA, civilians have been vic-
timised by abuses committed by the UPDF and the Local Defence Units (LDUs). Civilians 
who are alleged to be rebel collaborators have been subjected to arbitrary arrests and deten-
tion, torture and killings, just as rape and other sexual violence committed by government sol-
diers are frequent occurrences in and around the camps.11  
 
Throughout the conflict the GoU has unsuccessfully pursued a dual strategy of military actions 
and mediation to bring peace to the region12. In recent years, the urgency of finding a solution 
to the conflict has led to a number of important peace building initiatives, which have brought 
relative peace to the region. The first steps were taken when President Museveni in 2003 re-
ferred the situation in Northern Uganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which sub-
sequently led to arrest warrants against Kony and four of his senior leaders.  From a transi-
tional justice perspective this was an important development in contrast to the Amnesty Act 
passed in 2000, offering amnesty to all rebels engaged in armed rebellion since 26 January 
198613. Both critics and supporters of the ICC tend to agree that the ICC arrest warrants, along 
with changed political dynamics in neighbouring Sudan, have played a significant role in bring-
ing the LRA back the negotiating table14; thereby paving the way for the Juba Peace Talks in 
July 2006.  
 
                                               
7 Accord 2002:33 
8 Pham et al. 2008:404-410 
9 The exact number is uncertain. However, numbers from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee in 2005 estimated the number of IDPs in the districts of the West Nile, Acholi, 
Lango and Teso in 2005 to be 1,773,000 to which an unknown number in Karamoja district should be added. 
(IDMC 2009; IASC 2009)  
10 Otim & Wierda 2008:21-22 
11 HRW 2005:24-35 
12 ICTJ 2005:3 
13 Amnesty Act 2000:3 
14 Otim & Wierda 2008:22-23 
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The Juba Peace Talks have led to the signing of a fairly comprehensive framework of agree-
ments aimed at ending the conflict and bringing peace to the region and in which the GoU and 
the LRA agree to be “determined to bring back peace to Northern Uganda (…); convinced of the urgent 
need for reconciliation at the individual, community and national levels;” and “committed to finding comprehen-
sive and durable solutions to the conflict by peaceful means and through dialogue”15. While previous peace 
negotiations have been characterized by impunity through blanket amnesties to surrendering 
rebels, the Juba Peace Talks have included the signing of no less than five agreements, which 
address issues such as permanent ceasefire, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of 
ex-combatants, accountability and reconciliation for the perpetrators and victims, the return of 
the many IDPs, as well as the socio-economic inequalities in the country.  
 
While the Juba Peace Talks were soon hailed as a success and have been seen by many as the 
best opportunity to bring an end to the conflict, Kony has so far failed to sign the Final Peace 
Agreement (FPA). Instead he is making demands of a complete withdrawal of the ICC arrest 
warrants as a precondition for his signature. Although LRA’s actions have diminished in 
Northern Uganda, they are still operating, increasingly from bases in Sudan, the Democratic of 
Congo, the Central African Republic and Chad, which has led many critics to question the 
GoU’s strategy of pursuing justice as part of their peace building efforts arguing that peace 
must come first, justice later.  
 
1.1 Research question 
Consequently, it is the objective of this project to analyse the transitional justice processes 
within the GoU’s peace building efforts by approaching the question: To what extent has the no-
tion of transitional justice entered into the government of Uganda’s responses to the conflict in Northern 
Uganda, and what dilemmas are involved in applying transitional justice processes in the context of an ongoing 
conflict?  
 
To work towards this objective, this project will scrutinize the following working questions: 
 What are the background to and causes of the conflict in Northern Uganda?  
                                               
15 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities 2006:1 
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 To what extent have international notions of justice through the ICC affected GoU’s pur-
suit of justice? 
 To what extent have “traditional justice” mechanisms been part of the GoU’s pursuit of 
justice and how do they relate to the notion of transitional justice? 
 To what extent have other national justice mechanisms such as reparations to the victims, 
truth telling and institutional reform been part of the GoU’s strategy in pursuing justice?  
 Do the selected transitional justice mechanisms seek to address the causes or the conse-
quences of the conflict?  
 Do the selected transitional justice mechanisms create incentives or obstacles to achieving 
peace?  
 
While chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the objective of this project, chapter 2 intro-
duces the field of transitional justice within a peace and conflict resolution framework. It pro-
vides a theoretical discussion of the various transitional justice mechanisms, just as it considers 
how the pursuit of justice in the context of ongoing conflict affects the prospects for peace.  
 
In chapter 3 a historical discussion of key events leading to the conflict in Northern Uganda is 
provided. Rather than providing a detailed chronological historical overview, the chapter seeks 
to offer an explanation of the causes and dynamics of the conflict. 
 
Based on the discussion of the causes and dynamics of the conflict in chapter 3, chapter 4 then 
provides a presentation of the current transitional justice processes in Uganda as part of the 
GoU’s peace building efforts, and also includes some methodological considerations.   
 
Chapter 5, 6 and 7 constitute the analysis of the transitional justice mechanisms in Uganda. This 
includes an analysis of the impact of the ICC arrest warrants and the transitional justice proc-
esses established in the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and the Agreement 
on Comprehensive solutions during the Juba Peace Talks.  
 
Finally, chapter 8 draws conclusions on the GoU’s pursuit of justice in a situation of ongoing 
conflict and whether these efforts create incentives or obstacles to peace in Northern Uganda.  
 
  5 
2. Transitional justice 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the field of transitional justice 
within a conflict resolution framework. Transitional justice has traditionally been pursued in 
post-conflict settings, but recent years have seen the new development with pursuit of justice 
in times of ongoing conflict. Consequently, this chapter firstly discusses the concept of peace 
and its relation to justice; more specifically whether the pursuit of justice produces obstacles 
and/or incentives for peace. Secondly, it presents the historical context in which the field of 
transitional justice has developed. Thirdly, it discusses the definition of the concept of transi-
tional justice; and finally, it provides a theoretical discussion of the various transitional justice 
mechanisms, to enable an analysis of the transitional justice processes that has entered into the 
Government of Uganda’s responses to the conflict in Northern Uganda and the dilemmas 
connected hereto.  
 
2.1 Justice versus peace 
In the past, it was unlikely for justice to be pursued in ongoing conflict. When justice was im-
plemented, it was usually within a post-conflict setting or as part of a transition, as the demand 
for justice was often postponed to be dealt with (or more likely dismissed) at the negotiating 
table by those who have committed the violations. However, recent years have seen a new de-
velopment in the pursuit of justice in times of ongoing conflict16, especially with the develop-
ment of the international jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the expansion of 
transitional justice to include non-criminal mechanisms. However, applying justice processes as 
part of conflict resolution frameworks has led to debates on how this affects the prospects for 
peace. First, let us turn to the concept of peace.  
 
Peace research distinguishes between the concepts of negative and positive peace. Negative peace is 
understood as the absence of direct violence and includes tasks preventing relapse into vio-
lence, and positive peace includes tasks aiding national recovery and the removal of the under-
lying causes of the violence.17 This distinction takes its outset in peace researcher Johan Gal-
                                               
16 ICTJ 2007:1 
17 Mani 2002:12 
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tung’s work, which argues that peace studies must include both dimensions18 as only focusing 
on “the more narrow definition of negative peace as reduction of direct violence” is out of touch with the re-
alities. Instead he argues, “peace stands for the reduction of direct, structural, and cultural violence”.19 Gal-
tung distinguishes between three types of violence: 1) direct violence understood as physical 
acts of violence; 2) structural violence which is built into the political, social and economic sys-
tems that govern societies, states and the world; and 3) cultural violence that is the aspects of a 
culture that legitimise or make violence seem an acceptable mean of responding to conflict.20 
In this respect, negative peace represents the absence of direct physical violence such as cessa-
tion of hostilities, while positive peace represents the removal of structural and cultural vio-
lence21, and for positive peace to be present, all three must be reduced.  
 
In conflict resolution debates, the objectives of justice and peace are often presented as a di-
chotomy, where one is advanced at the expense of the other. As Pauline Baker puts it:  
Should peace be sought at any price to end bloodshed, even if power-sharing arrangements fail to up-
hold basic human rights and democratic principles? Or should the objective be a democratic peace that 
respects human rights, a goal that may prolong the fighting and risk more atrocities in the time that it 
takes to reach a negotiated solution?22   
 
The debate is divided between “conflict managers” for whom the goal is peace on the one 
side, and the “democratizers” for whom the goal is justice on the other. Conflict managers in-
clude those who advocate for a range of activities from preventive diplomacy and mediation to 
dispute resolution mechanisms, while democratizers include those who advocate human rights, 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the prosecution of those who commit war crimes 
and atrocities. In practice however, these groups often overlap.23  
 
Although acknowledging tensions along these lines, many scholars increasingly seem to agree 
that the one does not exclude the other. Among these, Ramsbotham et al argue that neither 
the concept of peace nor justice is as monolithic as often made out. Although negative peace, 
understood as the absence of direct violence, sometimes appears to be incompatible with 
achieving justice, the positive peace of long-term reconciliation often presupposes it, as“[i]n 
                                               
18 Galtung 1985:145 
19 Ibid. 1996:223 
20 Brand-Jacobsen 2000:17-18 
21 Mani 2002:12 
22 Baker 2001:756 
23 Ibid. 
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other words, the passage from negative to positive peace runs through justice”24, which they illustrate as fol-
lows:   
 
Table 2.1 From negative to positive peace 
Negative Peace  Justice  Positive Peace 
Absence of violence Rule of law 
Truth commissions/trials 
Reparation/distributive justice 
Long-term Reconciliation 
 
In this respect, the application of transitional justice processes is usually a prerequisite for 
peace as the way to long-term peace goes through that of justice. Although negative peace can 
be achieved without it, justice in some form must be addressed for long-term reconciliation to 
take place. Also the UN appears to acknowledge that the two are not incompatible as argued 
by the General Secretary: “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather 
mutually reinforcing imperatives”25.  
 
Consequently, the rest of this chapter will thoroughly scrutinize the various justice mechanisms 
that can enable the move from negative to positive peace by firstly introducing the historical 
context in which the field of transitional justice has developed followed by a definitional dis-
cussion of the concept of transitional justice to finally, provides a theoretical discussion of the 
various transitional justice mechanisms.  
 
2.2 Transitional justice in a historical perspective 
The historical development of the field of transitional justice can, according to Ruti G. Teitel, 
roughly be divided into three main phases26:  
 The post-World War II phase characterised by an emphasis on international criminal jus-
tice;  
 The post-Cold War phase characterised by a return to national criminal justice and the rise 
of non-criminal justice alternatives; and  
                                               
24 Ramsbotham et al. 2005:236 
25 UNSC 2004:1 
26 Teitel 2003:69ff 
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 The contemporary phase characterised by a complementary approach to transitional justice 
including criminal, non-criminal, and national as well as international justice mecha-
nisms.  
 
The post-World War II phase: International criminal justice  
The origins of the field of international transitional justice can be traced back to the post-
World War II settings27 with the establishment of the two ad hoc criminal tribunals: the Nur-
emberg Military Tribunals and the International Tribunal for the Far East (also known as the 
Tokyo Tribunal) that were established to prosecute German Nazi leaders and Japanese war 
criminals from World War II28. In this phase of transitional justice, the main emphasis was on 
the rule of law and individual accountability, and from a transitional justice perspective, it was 
significant at the time that national criminal justice was replaced by international criminal jus-
tice: 
While the asserted aim of the transitional justice norm in this first phase was accountability, a striking 
innovation at the time was the turn to international criminal law and the extension of its applicability be-
yond the state to the individual.29  
 
These prosecutions of war criminals may seem obvious today, but at the time it took extensive 
negotiations between the allied victors to agree on the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal30 with the signing of the London Agreement on 8 August 1945. This was mainly done to 
avoid the ridicule from the national trials in Germany after World War I that had resulted in 
acquittal or insignificant verdicts. The Nuremberg Tribunal was quickly followed by the US-led 
establishment of the Tokyo Tribunal on 19 January 1946 with the signing of the Tokyo Char-
ter.  These tribunals were groundbreaking as the individual accountability established by them 
included disregarding impunity for persons following orders, heads of state and other govern-
                                               
27 The first attempts towards establishing accountability for war crimes and human rights abuses took place in the 
late 19th century, with the development of the first Geneva Convention aimed at regulating the conducts of war 
and to protect civilians and prisoners of war. Actual law enforcement mechanisms did, however, first take root af-
ter World War II. 
28 Bickford 2004:1046; Verdeja 2004:327; Teitel 2003:72 
29 Teitel 2003:73 
30 The negotiations were mainly between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, although 
France supported and signed the final agreement. The point of view represented by the United Kingdoms was 
simply that executions without trial were sufficient to move forward, whereas both the Soviet Union and the 
United States argued in favor of trials. Although the Soviet Union argued in favor of trials, the trials were mainly 
thought of as a disguise for an already decided outcome; execution.  
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ment representatives. In addition, the tribunals established the principles of punishment for 
wars of aggression and crimes against humanity.31  
 
As a consequence, the period following World War II was the heyday of international justice. 
The legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals has evidently influenced the development 
of international humanitarian law, where individual accountability for wartime abuses was en-
trenched in international treaties, conventions and protocols, such as the UN Charter of 1945, 
the Genocide Convention of 1948, and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 followed by the 
Protocols of 197732, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of 1966.33 It was also then that the first steps towards a permanent 
international criminal court were taken with the establishment of the International Law Com-
mission in 1948, which was mandated to develop and codify international law, as well as to 
draft a statute for a permanent international criminal court.34 It was hoped that the establish-
ment of a permanent international criminal court could avoid some of the weaknesses of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as the two tribunals had been the target of lots of critique, 
especially focusing around three areas: 1) the tribunals were often seen as the establishment of 
victors’ justice; 2) they were based on ex-post facto-law35; and 3) the victors’ allies had commit-
ted some of the same crimes as the Germans and Japanese, but were never prosecuted.36 
 
However, the development of international humanitarian and human rights law stalled as a re-
sult of the Cold War and did not gain momentum again until the 1990s after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.  
 
                                               
31 Andersen 2008:11-22 
32 Although it did not gain momentum until after World War II, international humanitarian law can be traced back 
to 1860s with the adoption of the 1864 Geneva Convention, which laid the foundation for contemporary humani-
tarian law. (ICRC 2002:8) 
33 Teitel 2003:73 
34 Schabas 2007:8-11 
35 Law established with retrospective effect. (Andersen 2008:20) 
36 Andersen 2008:20 
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The post-Cold War phase: Towards alternative approaches 
The second phase of transitional justice started, according to Teitel, with the decline and even-
tual collapse of the Soviet Union. The period was characterised by the rise of nation building 
that emerged as a result of political transitions in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa in 
last two decades of the twentieth century. Rather than focusing on the international rule of law 
in terms of accountability for a small number of leaders after inter-state wars, the period was 
characterised by a domestic and more diverse rule of law understanding tied to particular po-
litical contexts and local conditions, reflecting the complex contexts and political dilemmas in-
herent in the political transitions.  
 
The period witnessed a return to domestic criminal justice when domestic judicial systems suc-
cessfully tried former members of the military juntas for their crimes in Greece in 1975 and 
Argentina in 1983. Meanwhile, a wide range of non-criminal justice mechanisms emerged as al-
ternative means to deal with the past.37 
 
The conceptions of justice that emerged in this period were hardly those of ideal rule of law, 
but rather contextualised conceptions of justice determined by the extraordinary political con-
texts of each transition. The focus on justice expanded to include reconciliation and peace for 
both individuals and society as a whole38, espousing what advocates refer to as restorative justice39.  
In a critical response to the Phase I post-war justice project, Phase II moved beyond retributive justice 
(…) and included questions about how to heal an entire society and incorporate diverse rule-of-law val-
ues, such as peace and reconciliation, that had previously been treated as largely external to the transi-
tional justice project.40   
 
This development may also express recognition of the fact that established international hu-
manitarian law regulated internal armed conflicts only to a very limited extent. 
 
Transitional justice was increasingly intended as a dialogue between victims and perpetrators, 
rather than focusing on merely holding the perpetrators accountable. As a result, multiple con-
ceptions of justice emerged in this period.  
 
                                               
37 Bickford 2004:1046-1047 
38 Teitel 2003:76-82 
39 Verdeja 2004:328 
40 Teitel 2003:77 
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Amnesty policies were adopted as a result of political negotiations41 with the aim of reconcilia-
tion, which in the post-World War II era had been considered exceptional42. In contrast to the 
blanket amnesties given in Latin America, in post-Apartheid South Africa amnesties were pro-
vided on an individual basis in exchange for a confession with full details of the crimes com-
mitted to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in 1995.43 Truth seeking efforts in-
creasingly gained strength and although varying in form, truth commissions were established in 
many transitional contexts around the world including East Timor, Ghana, Peru, Uganda and 
Sierra Leone44. Although the model is often associated with its South African predecessor, the 
first truth commission in a transitional context is the Argentine National Commission on the Disap-
pearance of People established in 198345, which produced information that was later used by the 
authorities in the domestic trials.46  
 
Other truth seeking efforts included endeavours to open up the files of former security agen-
cies to the public in Eastern Europe, e.g. the Stasi Records Act in post-communist Germany in 
1991, and institutional reform initiatives and the vetting or dismissals of past human rights of-
fenders from positions of power in the public sector in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and 
post-communist Germany, just as Argentina’s and Chile’s efforts to provide different forms of 
reparation to the victims established important contributions to establishing justice for the vic-
tims of human rights abuses.47  
 
The contemporary phase: A complementary approach to transitional justice  
Where the immediate post-Cold War phase of transitional justice was characterised by strate-
gies closely related to the particular domestic political developments and a general absence of 
international criminal justice, Teitel argues that the contemporary period is characterised by an 
attempted normalisation of transitional justice through the expansion of international humani-
                                               
41 Ibid.:1046 
42 Ibid.:82 
43 Kritz 1996:127 
44 Bickford 2004:1046; see Priscilla B. Hayner 2001, ”Unspeakable Truths  - confronting state terror and atrocity” 
pp. 291-297, for a chronological overview of truth commissions in the period 1973-2001.  
45 Earlier commissions were established in Uganda in 1973 and Bolivia in 1982. However, the first was not estab-
lished in a period of transition; instead it was established by President Idi Amin to investigate accusations of dis-
appearances at the hands of military forces during the first years of his rule; and the latter, although transitional, 
was disbanded before it had finished its work. (Hayner 2001:51;291) 
46 Kritz 1996:127 
47 Bickford 2004:1046 
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tarian law to times of peace, as “[w]hat was historically viewed as a legal phenomenon associated with ex-
traordinary post-conflict conditions now increasingly appears to be a reflection of ordinary times.” 48  
 
Teitel argues that in the contemporary period, transitional justice has become the norm or 
paradigm rather than the exception. While Teitel’s analysis rightly frames a development to-
wards a broader inclusion of transitional justice in political negotiations in conflict or post-
conflict situations, it might be an overstatement to call it a norm or a paradigm, as transitional 
justice is still the product of the particular political circumstances and dependent on the politi-
cal will in the different conflict or post-conflict settings.  
 
Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the human rights discourse from the post-World War II settings 
regained strength49, when the international society witnessed two of the decade’s most heinous 
intra-state conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The United Nations established two 
ad hoc international war criminal tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 
1994. The two tribunals represent a return to international criminal justice and the application 
of individual accountability, and became paramount for the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court in 2002.50  
 
This period has, moreover, shown a revival and hybridization of local traditional justice initia-
tives promoted by state as well as non-state actors. In Rwanda this was the case with the re-
launch of the Gacaca courts in which traditional conflict resolution mechanisms was combined 
with formal judicial features51, and as seen in Uganda with the promotion of traditional justice 
outside the formal judicial system52. 
 
Previously, it was unlikely to pursue claims of justice in a situation of ongoing conflict. Justice 
was often dealt with in a post-conflict context or as part of a political transition. The first tri-
bunal to be established in a situation of ongoing conflict was the ICTY, but subsequent inter-
                                               
48 Teitel 2003:89-90 
49 Although still the weakest component of international jurisprudence compared to for instance business or trade 
law; Verdeja 2004:327 
50 Bickford 2004:1046-1047 
51 Allen 2008:51 
52 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 2007:4 
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national jurisdictions in ongoing conflict also include the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL). However, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is so far the 
most innovative element in the normalization of transitional justice53, and the ICC has so far 
issued arrests warrants in four ongoing conflicts: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Sudan, and in the Central African Republic.54 The case of DRC is of historic signifi-
cance to the ICC, providing it with its first suspects in custody55.   
 
Teitel notes that the field of transitional justice has developed in ongoing critical cycles rather 
than as a progressive history of transitional justice. While she argues that the post-World War 
II phase’s emphasis on international criminal justice was a response to the inadequacies of the 
post-World War I domestic trials and that the Cold War phase’s rise in non-criminal and do-
mestic criminal justice mechanisms were based on a recognition that international criminal jus-
tice were inadequate to deal with the complex political transitions of the period, it is less clear 
from her argument what the contemporary phase is a critical response to.  
 
Rather than dividing the development into three phases, Bickford argues that the develop-
ments seen during the last two and a half decades reflect the fact that the field has increasingly 
gained coherence. Contemporary developments in international humanitarian law should, 
therefore, not be regarded as a replacement or disregard of former national criminal or non-
criminal justice mechanisms, but rather as complement hereto providing an opportunity to 
work with transitional justice in a holistic framework. Transitional justice strategies should 
consider complementary criminal and non-criminal justice mechanisms depending on the particu-
lar political context of the transition in order to ensure a comprehensive transitional justice ap-
proach.56  
 
                                               
53 ICTJ 2007:1 
54 ICC 2009a 
55 Thomas Lubanga, the leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais who was arrested on 17 March 2006, Ger-
main Katanga, commander of the Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri who was arrested on 17 October 2007, 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo, former leader of the Front des Nationalistes et des Intégrationnistes who was arrested 
on7 February 2008. (Clark 2008:39-40)  
56 Bickford 2004:1046-1047 
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2.3 Transitional justice – A definition 
At its core, transitional justice constitutes the link between the concept of transition, which re-
fers to a period of major political transformation, and the concept of justice, which refers to a 
wide range of complementary criminal and non-criminal justice mechanisms.  
 
In the article “Transitional Justice Genealogy”, Teitel defines transitional justice as: “the concep-
tion of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdo-
ings of repressive predecessor regimes”57, and in her book “Transitional Justice” she defines periods of 
political change as “a bounded period spanning two regimes”.58 However, given the contemporary de-
velopments in transitional justice with its application in ongoing conflicts and the fact that not 
only regimes commit the wrongdoings, the emphasis on periods of regime change and prede-
cessor regimes appears too narrow.  
 
A broader definition is offered by Bickford in Volume III of the “Encyclopaedia of Genocide 
and Crimes against Humanity” from 2004, where he defines transitional justice as “(…) a field of 
activity and inquiry focused on how societies address legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocities, or 
other forms of severe social trauma, including genocide and civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just 
and peaceful future”59.  
 
Another and more detailed and operational definition is found in the report of the UN Secre-
tary General “The rule of law and transitional in conflict and post-conflict societies” from 
2004:  
The notion of “transitional justice” (…) comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associ-
ated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to en-
sure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting 
and dismissal, or a combination thereof. 60  
 
This definition recognises the need for a complementary approach to transitional justice and 
operationalises the concept as it lists the various mechanisms that should be considered when 
approaching transitional justice.  
                                               
57 Teitel 2003:69 
58 Ibid. 2000:5 
59 Bickford 2004:1045 
60 UNSC 2004:4 
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The definition offered in the Secretary General’s report does not, however, touch upon the is-
sue of the transition itself, which is why the definition can appropriately be supplemented with 
Bickford’s argument, which rightfully defines transitions as “a major political transformation, such as 
regime change from authoritarian or repressive rule to democratic or electoral rule or a transition from conflict to 
peace and stability”61, and the definition offered by the International Center for Transitional Jus-
tice, which further clarifies that “[i]n some cases these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they 
may take place over decades”62, hereby transcending Teitel’s somewhat narrow definition with fo-
cus on a period spanning regime change.  
 
The objectives of transitional justice vary between the different definitions, but that also ap-
plies to transitional justice mechanisms put into practice. Teitel argues that the concept of jus-
tice in periods of political change alternately is constituted by, and constitutive of the transi-
tion, as such no universal model is applicable.63 In accordance with the UN’s definition, the 
objectives of transitional justice are to ensure accountability, justice, reconciliation, and 
Bickford adds to that a more democratic and peaceful future. For Teitel, transitional justice 
mechanisms should be evaluated on their prospect to enable the construction of a normative 
shift towards democracy.64 The objectives of a country’s transitional justice strategy may vary 
from case to case and are dependent on the given political context.  
 
To summarise, the concept of transitional justice in this report refers to a framework of 
mechanisms for confronting past abuses in a situation of major political change, such as re-
gime change or a transition from conflict to peace or stability, which generally involve a wide 
range of complementary criminal and non-criminal justice mechanisms to ensure either account-
ability, justice, reconciliation, peace and democracy or a combination thereof.  
 
2.4 Transitional justice – A theoretical framework  
Transitional justice as a theoretical framework should be understood in a historical compara-
tive perspective as it has developed as a result of and in relation to the international political 
                                               
61 Bickford 2004:1046 
62 ICTJ 2008a 
63 Teitel 2000:6 
64 Ibid.:7 
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reality since World War II, and as such has a rather young theoretical tradition in academia. As 
the field of transitional justice has developed in response to political realities it has a sound 
empirical foundation and is based upon experiences from a broad spectrum of cases in devel-
oped as well as developing countries. The theoretical framework of transitional justice adopts a 
largely inductive method65 taking its outset in the political realities of the country or conflict 
under consideration and does not imply the application of a universal or ideal framework. As a 
consequence, it is important to bear in mind that comparative conclusions between countries 
cannot be made unless taking into account the political, socio-economic and cultural particu-
larities of each situation.  
 
As the theoretical field of transitional justice is still relatively young and lacks a complete and 
comprehensive theoretical framework, the theoretical framework applied here draws on several 
scholars’ work; an approach that benefits from providing more multifaceted discussions on the 
transitional justice mechanisms than if simply one scholar’s framework was adopted. The theo-
retical discussion mainly includes Ruti G. Teitel’s book “Transitional Justice” from 2000, 
Priscilla Hayner’s book “Unspeakable Truths” from 2002, Ernesto Verdeja’s text “Institutional 
Responses to Genocide and Mass Atrocity” from 2004, Rami Mani’s book “Beyond Retribu-
tion – Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War” from 2002, Neil Kritz’s article “Coming to 
Terms with Atrocities“  from 1997, and finally Daly & Sarkin’s book “Reconciliation in Di-
vided Societies” from 2008.  
 
The theoretical discussion will be structured thematically and will take its outset in a presenta-
tion and discussion of criminal justice mechanisms including international, national and hybrid 
tribunals followed by the non-criminal transitional justice mechanisms including reparations, 
truth-seeking efforts and institutional reforms. The various mechanisms will be discussed in re-
lation to their ability to contribute to the overall goals of transitional justice.  
 
Criminal justice mechanisms  
According to Verdeja, retributive justice is the moving force behind criminal prosecutions in do-
mestic and international tribunals. As manifested in trials, the key objective of criminal justice 
                                               
65 Ibid.:6 
  17 
is to establish accountability and create accurate historical accounts of past violations, just as it 
contributes to re-establishing the rule of law by rejecting impunity.66 While most academic dis-
cussions on retributive justice, like Verdeja, focus on national and international trials, the UN 
in its report “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” 
agree that the administration of justice usually implies the formal judicial mechanisms, but fur-
thermore argues that “traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are equally relevant”.67  
 
Retributive justice through trials is first and foremost created to assign responsibility. They fo-
cus on the perpetrators rather than the victims and are driven by the importance of placing ac-
countability. Though powerful on assigning accountability, the primary goal of trials is not to 
recognise the suffering of the victims. Most tribunals only allow victim testimonies as a means 
of furthering the prosecution and do not address the psychological and material needs of the 
victims. But the question is accountability by whom? By identifying specific persons or agen-
cies as violators, tribunals avoid indicting entire ethnic groups. This may pose issues of selec-
tivity. At best, the post-conflict regimes can only prosecute a selective number of violators, 
which may pose issues in situations where a large number of people have participated in the 
violations such as, for instance, genocide. Confronted by this limitation, Verdeja argues that 
trials are best used to prosecute high-level authors of the crimes and their immediate subordi-
nates.68  
 
There is general agreement among scholars that criminal or retributive justice contributes to 
creating factual accounts of the past, but because they seek evidence to prosecute individuals, 
the information put forth is often fragmented and as such does not provide a complete picture 
of the repression, atrocities and violence committed.69 Consequently, other truth seeking ef-
forts offer important complements hereto. 
 
Prosecutions can, however and as argued by Kritz, provide the victims with a sense of justice 
that their grievances have been addressed. Kritz finds individual accountability through trials 
crucial to establish accountability and long-term reconciliation, as they reject collective guilt 
                                               
66 Verdeja 2000:330-331 
67 UNSC 2004:4 
68 Verdeja 2000:330-331 
69 Ibid:331; Kritz 1997:128  
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and retribution on entire ethnic, political and religious groups that otherwise can produce fur-
ther cycles of resentment and violence. In agreement with Verdeja that trials may be limited to 
senior key individuals or certain groups of perpetrators, Kritz emphasizes the importance of 
this as he considers that “total impunity in the form of comprehensive amnesties or the absence of any form 
of accountability for past atrocities, is immoral, injurious to the victims, and in violation of international legal 
norms.” 70 
 
Kritz does not define long-term reconciliation, but the concept of reconciliation in post-
conflict or conflict societies often refers to a process in which broken relationships are re-
stored and people are able to move forward. According to Priscilla B. Hayner, reconciliation 
“implies building or rebuilding relationships today that are not haunted by the conflicts and hatreds of yester-
day.”71 In this respect, a distinction should be made between individual and national or political 
reconciliation. Hayner argues that reconciliation at the individual level is rather complex, as 
forgiveness, healing and reconciliation are deeply personal processes, which may differ from 
person to person.72 As a consequence, institutional responses to past atrocities mainly contrib-
ute to national and political reconciliation. ICTJ, moreover, argues that reconciliation “is some-
thing that occurs in the civic or political sphere”, while national or political reconciliation are under-
stood as establishing trust in official institutions, which will increase through the visibly effec-
tive implementation of transitional justice initiatives.73 
 
That being said, the conventional argument for criminal and retributive justice tends to focus 
on accountability and the deterrent effect that punishment has in society74 rather than recon-
ciliation. As argued by Kritz, “criminal prosecution in some form must remain a threat and reality”75.  Al-
though retribution is sometimes considered no more than an excuse for vengeance, Verdeja 
argues that it is distinguishes itself from vengeance as an institutionalized punitive response 
based on the rule of law “by tempering the demand for swift retaliation with substantive and procedural 
protections for the accused, and replacing the victim’s desire for immediate reprisal with the rule of law.76 Fur-
                                               
70 Kritz 1996:128-129 
71 Hayner 2001:161 
72 Ibid.:155 
73 ICTJ 2006 
74 Teitel 2000:28 
75 Kritz 1996:129 
76 Verdeja 2004:228-331 
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thermore, holding the perpetrators accountable eliminates enclaves of impunity and publicly 
condemns past violations, both crucial goals for societies to enhance the rule of law and re-
build themselves in a democratic order according to Verdeja.77  
 
Teitel offers a similar argument. She argues that criminal justice as manifested in successor trials 
are commonly thought to play the leading foundational role in the transformation to a more 
liberal political order, as trials are thought to draw a bright line demarcating the normative shift 
from illegitimate to legitimate rule. Although criminal justice is conventionally considered 
largely retributive with emphasis on individual accountability, it is corrective and goes beyond 
the individual perpetrator to the broader society. She agrees with Verdeja that transitional prac-
tices show that trials are few and that individual accountability frequently is inapplicable, but 
emphasizes that this often spurs the development of new legal reforms and as such has great 
potential in advancing the reconstruction of rule of law.78 In relation to this, Mani argues that 
during conflict the rule of law is often de-legitimized, weakened or totally absent. Conse-
quently, restoring the rule of law or legal justice may serve as an indication to combatants and ci-
vilians of a return to security, order and stability and that the government, combatants and ci-
vilians, regardless of affiliation, are equals in front of the law.79  
 
To summarise, retributive and criminal justice, as manifested in international and national trials 
as well as traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, mainly contribute to accountability for 
the perpetrators and a sense of justice for the victims, just as the enhancement of the rule of 
law might increase political and national reconciliation.  
 
Non-criminal justice mechanisms 
Due to the narrow focus of criminal justice on perpetrators, it is often deemed necessary to 
apply non-criminal justice mechanisms to address past and current atrocities in a more com-
prehensive manner. To conceptualise the various non-criminal justice mechanisms, Verdeja’s 
notion of restorative justice can be applied. 
 
Truth Commissions 
                                               
77 Ibid.:331 
78 Teitel 2000:7;67 
79 Mani 2002:6 
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Verdeja uses truth commissions to exemplify this restorative justice approach, as he considers 
these to be paradigmatic examples of this notion of justice. According to Verdeja, restorative 
justice, articulated through truth commissions, shifts the focus from the perpetrators to the 
victims and offers the establishment of broader accounts of the past than found in trials, pro-
viding an important complement to prosecution driven retribution.80  
 
In general, truth commissions seek to foster reconciliation81 through the establishment of accu-
rate records of the past covering a specific period or conflict. Truth commissions benefit from 
the involvement of victims, relatives, bystanders and perpetrators and as such have the poten-
tial to be better rooted in society than tribunals. By providing the victims with a public plat-
form to tell their stories, the commissions can contribute to personal healing.82 Although there 
are examples of truth commissions leading to personal healing and immediate forgiveness, it 
may be argued that their true strength lies in advancing reconciliation at the national or politi-
cal level rather than at the individual level. According to Hayner, reconciliation in truth com-
missions is not so much about re-establishing friendly relationships, but about reconciling con-
tradictory facts and stories, which depends on the interest, will and participation of the broader 
society.83  
 
Teitel uses the concept of historical justice to show that historical inquiry and narrative can play 
an important transitional role in linking the past to the present, and thereby creating a collec-
tive memory and reconstruction of the state’s political identity, which can take place through 
both truth commissions and trials. Teitel argues that whereas trials contribute to de-
legitimizing the past by rejecting impunity through punishment, truth commissions’ mandate 
has emerged as a compromise between punishment and amnesty. Although the victims’ testi-
monies in truth commissions are lacking cross-examination, knowledge of the past is con-
structed through these public processes and helps to construct a sense of societal consensus.84  
 
                                               
80 Verdeja 2004:331 
81 Hayner 2001:155; Verdeja 2004:334 
82 Verdeja 2004:332-333 
83 Hayner 2001:155;163-165 
84 Teitel 2000:72-83 
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Truth commissions, moreover, contribute to some level of accountability. Although they often 
lack subpoena powers and formal capacity to punish85, the use of symbolic forms of punish-
ment through shaming and public humiliation of the perpetrators by linking the individual to 
specific actions and morally condemning persons connected hereto provide a degree of ac-
countability that resonates with the public. In addition, some truth commissions forward their 
work to tribunals or make recommendations for prosecutions thereby contributing to criminal 
accountability just as they can make recommendations for reparations and institutional re-
form.86 As such truth commissions can complement other both criminal and non-criminal jus-
tice mechanisms.  
 
Reparations 
Mani uses the concept of rectificatory justice to refer to the question of how to deal with the injus-
tice inflicted on people in terms of direct physical violence. She argues like Verdeja that rectifi-
catory justice typically is established through trials and truth commissions, but argues that the 
narrow focus on individuals in trials and truth commissions, whether it be on perpetrators or 
victims, are insufficient. Consequently, she reconceptualises rectificatory justice to reparative jus-
tice, as she argues that “[a] conception is required which comprehends and responds to all ‘survivors’ of con-
flict – victims, offenders and society at large.” Reparative justice seeks to redress the legal as well as 
moral or psychological injustice suffered such as victimization and loss of dignity. The concept 
is survivor-focused as it encompasses the needs of all people within society who have survived 
conflict and are now required to build a political community together, regardless of their diver-
gent past.87  
 
The reparations may be material as well as non-material:  
(…) the main forms of legal reparation are restitution, compensation, indemnity, satisfaction and de-
claratory judgment, and combine monetary and non-material means; the common forms of social repa-
ration undertaken in transitional societies include commemoration, symbolic redress, official acknowl-
edgement, apology, education and establishing the truth.88 
 
                                               
85 However, it must be emphasized that wide range of truth commissions differ in many aspects; some have sub-
poena powers, which was seen in South Africa for instance, where perpetrators were subpoenaed if not confess-
ing their crimes in full details in return for an amnesty; others are merely mandated to name perpetrators and 
make recommendations, just as they differ in length and number of parties to be investigated. (Hayner 2001:321-
322) 
86 Verdeja 2004:332-333 
87 Mani 2002:7;123-124; 174-175 
88 Ibid.:174 
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Reparatory justice does not disregard punishment or prosecutions, but rather requires and de-
mands a combination of the various measures or the innovation of new ones to address the 
varied requirements of each post-conflict situation.89 According to Teitel, reparatory justice fo-
cuses on the repair of prior wrongs in which the rights of the victims and the broader society 
should be acknowledged. Transitional reparations take many forms and range over the conven-
tional material compensations and monetary payments to the more non-conventional forms 
such as education or other public benefits such as memorials, legislative rehabilitation, and 
apologies. Where Mani focuses on the rehabilitation of society as a whole, Teitel argues that 
reparatory justice appears most definitional of the liberalizing move towards democracy, as 
these responses instantiate recognition of individual rights, which is fundamental to the liberal 
state. 90  
 
While Mani argues that reparations should transcend the conventional victim-perpetrator fo-
cus, Hayner suggests that situations where perpetrators acknowledge their acts, genuinely ask 
for forgiveness and provide some kind of symbolic reparation to the victims, reconciliation be-
tween the former opponents may take place. This process can be enhanced by the collabora-
tion of both sides in reparations programmes and community development projects. However, 
as Teitel argues, where gross structural inequalities and material needs are present, it is not suf-
ficient to consider inter-personal reconciliation processes, but the inequalities and material 
needs must be addressed as well to create a sense of social justice contributing to political and 
national reconciliation91.  
 
Institutional reforms 
Daly & Sarkin’s recently published book Reconciliation in Divided Societies suggests that political 
and economic reforms are crucial to national and political reconciliation. Rather than focusing 
on the conventional understandings of reconciliation, which tend to stress interpersonal rela-
tionships, they argue that transitional societies should be advised to spend their limited capital 
to create political and economic structures that are rooted in the particular needs of the society. 
This should be conducted in a manner which allows for all to participate in public life on an 
equal footing. This structural understanding of reconciliation is likely in the long run to con-
                                               
89 Ibid.:175 
90 Teitel 2000:8;146 
91 Hayner 2001:164-165 
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tribute to securing peace and long-term stability. Daly & Sarkin agree with Mani that successful 
transitions incorporate multiple reforms to encourage national and political reconciliation: 1) 
Political reform through regular and open elections, a free press, and public-protecting institu-
tions; 2) economic reform through large-scale economic reform, including redistribution of 
wealth, land reform, and broadened economic opportunities for all; and 3) legal reform 
through the rewriting of the constitution in a manner that is both procedurally and substan-
tially inclusive.92  
 
In addition to economic and political reforms, Teitel emphasises the importance of re-
establishing the rule of law through administrative and constitutional justice, more specifically the 
role of law in reconstructing the political order and guiding political transitions in a liberalizing 
direction. Administrative and constitutional justice focuses on the use of public law to redefine 
parameters of political membership, participation, and leadership that constitute the political 
community.  Law is seen as dynamic mediating texts through which law can be used to re-
spond to the past, as well as to reshape the successor order, and hence has potential for re-
structuring the relation of the individual to the political community in transition.93  
 
Mani agrees with Teitel on the importance of re-establishing the rule of law and argues that the 
rule of law, which she refers to as legal justice, needs to be reformed or rebuilt entirely, as restor-
ing the rule of law may serve as an indication to combatants and civilians of a return security, 
order and stability. However, while Teitel focuses on law making’s potential in guiding a coun-
try in a liberalizing direction, Mani is less optimistic. Mani argues that in societies emerging 
from systematic and sustained atrocities with a vulnerable political situation, law is prone to 
manipulation and is more easily intended to suit the ruling regime. As a consequence, it may be 
necessary to distinguish justice from the political sphere. Mani argues that legal justice should 
seek to integrate and balance customary law and local legal traditions with modern law and 
universal principles of legality, but emphasises that this does not mean turning to local prac-
tices without considering their content, impact and outcome.94  
 
                                               
92 Daly & Sarkin 2007:xiv; 255 
93 Teitel 2000:3-8 
94 Mani 2002:6;171-172 
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Economic reforms can contribute to national reconciliation by addressing what Mani refers to 
as distributive justice. She argues that the underlying causes of the conflict should be addressed, 
which often lie in real or perceived socio economic, political or cultural injustice. Distributive 
justice must first and foremost examine the past and seek to redress deep-rooted historical in-
justices stemming from structural and systemic inequalities between groups that have contrib-
uted to the conflict. The second step is hence to address these root causes through priorities of 
distribution and social justice, while bearing in mind that economic and political inequalities 
are often inter-linked. In developing countries this is not so much about distributing surplus, 
but rather about alleviating poverty and meeting basic human needs.95  
 
2.5 Summary  
While the pursuit of justice has often taken place in post-conflict settings or as part of political 
transitions, in recent developments justice initiatives are often included as part of conflict reso-
lution initiatives. Consensus seems to have emerged that justice in some form is necessary to 
move from negative peace understood as the mere absence of violence, to positive peace and 
long-term reconciliation. A comprehensive approach to transitional justice must include crimi-
nal as well as non-criminal justice processes. While retributive and criminal justice, as mani-
fested in trials and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, mainly contribute to account-
ability for the perpetrators and provides the victims with a sense of justice, it has potential in 
contributing to national and political reconciliation through the enhancement of the rule of 
law. Restorative justice mechanisms on the other hand, as manifested in truth commissions, 
reparation programmes and institutional reforms, mainly contribute to reconciliation. Rather 
than focusing on the perpetrators only, non-criminal justice mechanisms take a ‘survivor’-
based focus and look at the needs of all survivors of the conflict as well as society as a whole, 
just as they have potential of establishing a comprehensive historical account of the past as 
well as recognizing the rights of the individuals, which is why a comprehensive transitional jus-
tice approach includes criminal as well as non-criminal processes.  
                                               
95 Ibid.:179-181 
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3. The conflict – A historical overview 
This chapter provides a historical overview of the conflict to enable an understanding of the 
political context within which the conflict has developed. Its purpose is not to provide a de-
tailed chronological account of Uganda’s history, but rather to seek to understand the causes 
and the context of the conflict. The historical discussion takes its point of departure the in arti-
cle “Kony’s message: A New Koine?” written by Doom & Vlassenroot and the book “Alice 
Lakwena & the Holy Spirits” written by Heike Behrend in order to establish a historical, com-
parative, and structural perspective on the causes of the conflict and the divisions in Uganda.  
 
3.1 The legacy of colonialism 
In order to understand the current conflict in Northern Uganda, Doom & Vlassenroot argue 
that a historical, comparative and structural analysis is needed.96 They argue that British colo-
nial rule between 1894 and 1962 effectively created a socio-economic division between North-
ern and Southern Uganda that marginalized the North from the rest of the country; and that 
that division has persisted in post-colonial Uganda.97  
 
As a result of the British introduction of industry and cash crop production in the South, the 
country became divided into productive zones in the South and the East producing cotton, 
plantation rubber, cocoa and later coffee, and non-productive zones in the North and the 
West.98 The most crucial division, however, was in the recruitment of labour. While the people 
in the South, especially from Buganda, were employed in the civil service, the people in the 
North, mainly from the ethnic group of the Acholi99, were employed in the armed services100, 
                                               
96 This argument stands in contrast to other authors’ arguments that certain ethnic groups or geographic areas 
have certain defining characteristics that make them more prone to enter conflict than others. For further interest, 
please see Samuel P. Huntington’s book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" from 
1996 and Robert D. Kaplan’s book "The Ends of the Earth - A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century" from 
1996 for such arguments.  
97 Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:7 
98 Olsen 2006:78 
99 According to CIA World Factbook the Ugandan people is consituted by at least 11 different ethnic groups: Ba-
ganda 16.9%, Banyakole 9.5%, Basoga 8.4%, Bakiga 6.9%, Iteso 6.4%, Langi 6.1%, Acholi 4.7%, Bagisu 4.6%, 
Lugbara 4.2%, Bunyoro 2.7%, and other 29.6%. (CIA World Factbook 2009) However, as demonstrated with the 
occurrence of the ethnic group Acholi, these are not primordial inherent identities, but may changes over time 
due to certain historical, political and socio-economic situations. The numbers, however, give an idea of the multi-
ethnic context in Uganda.  
100 Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:7-8 
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which divided Uganda between the political and economic elite in the South and the Acholi 
“military ethnocracy” in the North.101 The recruitment policy formed an ethnic military identity 
among the Acholi, which had only been a vague notion in the pre-colonial days.102   As 
Behrend argues, pre-colonial Uganda was characterized by “various clan identities, which determined 
one’s belonging to a territory and political unit, the chiefdom”. These chiefdoms laid the foundation for 
the administrative units under the British rule and were unified into one Acholi district; thus 
creating an ethnic group that had not previously existed. Behrend argues that: “With the domi-
nance of colonial power, a complex process ensued in which ethnicity actualized itself more and more in struggles 
to participate in central power”. However, although an Acholi identity took form, inner contradic-
tions emerged as well i.e. between the Westerners and the Easterners, the rich and poor, the 
young and the old, women and men etc.103 As demonstrated by Doom & Vlassenroot, “the 
asymmetric relationship between economic underdevelopment and dominance in the military sector (…) is a deci-
sive antecedent of the current turmoil.”104 
 
3.2 The post-colonial struggles 
The division established during the British colonial administration between 1894 and1962 per-
sisted in the post-colonial history of Uganda, where violent struggles over political power re-
sulted in one coup d’état after the other.105 From the independence on 9 October 1962 to date, 
Uganda has had nine different heads of states with varying tenures.106 When Milton Obote be-
came the first Prime Minister (1962-1966; thereafter President 1966-1971) of the post-colonial 
Uganda, he inherited a military primarily dominated by Acholi from the North. Under the rule 
of Obote, the tensions between the North and the South increased, just as ethnic identities 
were further exacerbated: “although, or perhaps precisely because, Obote tried to pursue an anti-tribal pol-
icy”. Disagreements emerged between the central and regional authorities of Buganda, who had 
been privileged during the British rule and now felt disadvantaged.107  Obote effectively used 
the military to settle the issues, abolished the kingdom of Buganda and turned the state into a 
republic with strong presidential powers. As argued by Doom & Vlassenroot “[m]ilitary power 
                                               
101 Olsen 2006:78 
102 Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:5-8 
103 Behrend 1999:14-16 
104 Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:5-8 
105 Ibid.:8 
106 Latigo 2008:86 
107 Behrend 1999:19 
  27 
proved to be a key factor in settling political disputes”108, and it has played a huge role in politics ever 
since.  
 
Idi Amin, who had been appointed as army commander in 1966 was well aware of the strategic 
importance of the military in political affairs and shortly after his appointment began reshuf-
fling the army by recruiting people from his home region in the West Nile into strategic posi-
tions, while he dismissed or executed Acholi officers. With a military of new regional and eth-
nic composition, Amin managed to seize power on 25 January 1971, which brought Uganda 
into a regime of indiscriminate killings and torture of “anybody for whatever reason, Acholi officers 
were among the most likely to be targeted”.109 
 
As a response to the brutal regime introduced by Amin, the anti-governmental and Acholi-
dominated Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) was established in Tanzania, sup-
ported by the Tanzanian army. On 13 April 1979, UNLA invaded Uganda and overthrew 
Amin and his armed forces, whereafter Obote was reinstalled as President (1980-1985). Al-
though the leadership had different roots, Obote came from the ethnic group Langi, the 
UNLA army was predominantly Acholi.110 The UNLA toppling of Amin’s regime resulted in 
yet another outbreak of a brutal civil war between the UNLA and the anti-government insur-
gency group, the National Resistance Army (NRA), established by Yoweri Museveni in 1981. 
Obote remained in power until 1985, when Lieutenant-General Basilio Olara-Okello and Gen-
eral Tito Okello Lutwa from the UNLA overthrew him after internal rivalries within the 
UNLA.111  
 
With the Acholi Okello Lutwa as President, the Acholi held both political and military power 
for the first time in Ugandan history. Okello Lutwa agreed to negotiate peace with Museveni 
and the NRA under the Nairobi Peace Agreement.112 However, as Behrend has since argued, 
“to this day the Acholi refer to these peace talks as peace jokes”, as in reality both parties were just buy-
ing time to reorganise. A conflict, consequently, soon broke out, and the Museveni-headed 
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NRA seized power on 26 January 1986,113 and has held power ever since. Museveni’s disregard 
of the Nairobi Peace Agreement and the total exclusion from power of Acholi in all domains 
has caused continued and widespread violent resistance and an absence of political support in 
the North.  
 
3.3 The emergence of the LRA 
After the coup in 1986 the NRA had ordered the people of Acholi to surrender their weapons; 
however, previous experiences had created mistrust in such initiatives, which led many to keep 
them.114 Some returned to their home villages, hid their weapons and tried life as peasants. 
Few, however, were able to do so, as they had become accustomed to living by plundering and 
despising peasant life during the civil war:“like returned emigrant workers, they had become internal 
strangers”, and their return often caused unrest and disputes115. Others organized themselves in 
numerous resistance groups in the North116 of which the most prominent consisted of soldiers 
from the UNLA, the Uganda’s People Democratic Army (UPDA) led by Brigadier Odong 
Latek (a resistance group formed by former Obote and Amin supporters aimed at recapturing 
power), the Holy Spirit Movements (HSM) led by the prophetess Alice Lakwena, the Holy 
Spirit Movement II (HSM II) led by Alice’s father Severino Lukoya, and finally the Lord’s Re-
sistance Army (LRA)117 led by Joseph Kony.118 With the exception of the LRA, many of these 
groups soon either surrendered or were defeated by the NRA.119  
 
Kony had on several occasions unsuccessfully tried to join Lakwena’s HSM and later at-
tempted cooperation with Lukoya. However, with the defeat of HSM, Kony established the 
LRA with support from some UPDA and former HSM forces that had rejected an amnesty of-
                                               
113 Behrend 1999:24 
114 In 1913, the British administration had seized and burned the weapons of the Acholi, who voluntarily had 
handed them over for registration purposes, just as Idi Amin in 1971-1972 burned thousands of Acholi after hav-
ing surrendered. Hence, fear of repetition led many to keep the weapons. (Behrend 1999:24)  
115 Ibid. 
116 The incorporation of unemployed soldiers into the various resistance groups, as Behrend points out, can be 
seen as an attempt to reintegrate and rehabilitate soldiers who had become internal strangers as well as an attempt 
to regain central power. (Behrend 1999:19) 
117 Kony started his movement as the Holy Spirit Movement II, renamed it the Lord’s Salvation Army, the United 
Democratic Christian Force, and finally the Lord Resistance Army. (Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:22) 
118 Latigo 2008:88 
119 Olsen 2006:9 
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fered to them during the Gulu Peace Accord in 1988.120 LRA’s operations were not very suc-
cessful and its popular support was considerably less than that of its predecessors. The group 
has nevertheless managed to survive for more than 20 years121, which can be mainly accredited 
to two things: 1) its strategy of forced conscription, and 2) support for LRA from the GoS. 
 
Strategy of forced conscription 
While most Acholi in the North want Museveni removed from office, the war fatigue caused 
decline in support to the LRA during the 1990s, which led to decreased voluntary conscription 
to the LRA. To maintain its military capacity, the LRA applied a strategy of forced conscrip-
tion mainly targeting children and the youth, which were deemed easier to manipulate.122 Al-
though there are no agreed official numbers, a recent study from 2008 estimates that the LRA 
has abducted between approximately 54,000-75,000 between 1986 and 2006 , of which 25,000-
38,000 were children at the time of the abduction.123 
 
Regional dimension of the conflict 
Another factor, which may explain the LRA’s ability to survive, is the regionalization of the 
conflict. Throughout the conflict the GoU has pursued a dual strategy of military actions and 
mediation to bring peace to regions.124 However, with the exception of one ceasefire resulting 
from the Bigombe peace talks, which began in the mid-1990s125 to the Juba Peace Talks in 
                                               
120 Museveni offered amnesty to any rebel who stopped fighting and the army-to-army peace talks between the 
NRA and UPDA commanders on 17 March 1988 resulted in the Gulu Peace Accord signed on 3 June 1988. Most 
of the combatants accepted the amnesty, while some 2,000 former UPDA soldiers integrated into the NRA or the 
local militias the Local Defense Units (LDU), where they now fought against their former comrades. While the 
HSM forces led by Alice Lakwena had already been defeated in October 1987 resulting in Alice’s flight to Kenya, 
the UPDA had virtually ceased to exist in 1989. (Behrend 1999:173-174; Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:13-16)  
121 Olsen 2006:81 
122 Ibid. 
123 They draw their numbers from data collected from eight out of nine active reception centres established for 
LRA returnees the 1990s, which has been crossed checked with data collected by UNICEF and Concerned Par-
ents Association. Nevertheless, the number is still very uncertain, and it is estimated that less than half of the child 
returnees pass through a reception centre. (Pham et al. 2008:404-410) 
124 ICTJ 2005:3 
125 As a result of the GoU’s military operation “Operation North” in 1991, the conflict dropped in intensity in 
1992-1993, which resulted in formal peace talks with the LRA in 1994 headed by the Acholi Minister for the 
North Betty Bigombe leading to a ceasefire and safe conduct guarantees. The negotiations failed, when Kony re-
quested a delay for final negotiations, as Museveni lost his patience and gave the LRA an ultimatum in February 
1994 demanding all LRA to hand over its weapons within one week. This deadline destroyed all hopes of finaliz-
ing the negotiations and the war entered its second phase. However, Bigombe pursued peace negotiations until 
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2006, the attempts of negotiating peace, led nowhere but to military attacks. In 2002, the 
Ugandan army, now called the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) launched the first Iron 
Fist Offensive in an open alliance with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA); a resis-
tance group operating in Southern Sudan, which was followed by the more effective second 
Iron Fist Offensive in 2004.126 To retaliate against the GoU’s barely disguised support for the 
SPLA, the Government of Sudan’s (GoS) offered generous assistance to support the LRA. In 
effect, the LRA became one of the GoS’ many militias and the LRA has been directly engaged 
in fighting the SPLA. The GoS provided the LRA with weapons, training facilities and encour-
aged Kony to move his headquarters to Juba.127 The LRA consequently established a base in 
Southern Sudan from where it launched its attacks into Northern Uganda while at the same 
time fighting against the SPLA. This new strategy required a larger army, which resulted in in-
creased forced conscription.128 
 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the GoS and the SPLA (CPA) in January 2005 
changed political dynamics in Southern Sudan, which resulted in the GoS withdrawal of the 
Sudanese army from Southern Sudan. Direct support to the LRA from the GoS was, conse-
quently, significantly compromised, which caused many LRA forces to relocate to the Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo (DRC)129 and the Central African Republic. LRA attacks in the 
DRC130, the Central African Republic131 and Chad132 are currently commonly reported just as it 
is reported that at least 68,000 people have been displaced and 188 have been killed this year 
alone in South Sudan by LRA attacks.133 In effect, the conflict has ended in Northern Uganda; 
                                                                                                                                               
they finally stalled in the second half of 2005. (ICTJ 2007:5; Behrend 1999:173-174; Doom & Vlassenroot 
1999:20-24)  
126 Allen 2006:50-52 
127 Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:28 
128 Allen 2006:49 
129 Otim & Wierda 2008:22-23 
130 On 18 September 2009, Resolve Uganda for instance reported that 12 Congolese civilians were killed and over 
30 abducted by LRA forces in a week. At that point, intelligence reports indicated that many LRA rebels based in 
the DRC were moving into the neighboring Central African Republic, where LRA leader Joseph Kony is believed 
to be hiding. (Resolve Uganda 2009) 
131 On 5 October 2009, Resolve Uganda reported of intensified LRA attacks in the Central African Republic with 
killing the three aid workers and newly displacing thousands of people. (Resolve Uganda 2009a)  
132 Recent news from the Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA) inform that after facing heavy pounding from the 
Congolese and Ugandan armies in the DRC and the Central African Republic, Kony and his LRA soldiers are 
moving to Chad. (DPA 2009) 
133 Resolve Uganda 2009 
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meanwhile the LRA remains a regional problem suggesting that the LRA have withdrawn from 
the peace process134.  
 
Violence as a means of social control 
One of the most striking characteristics of the conflict in Northern Uganda is the brutality and 
apparent arbitrariness of the LRA’s means of conduct, which increasingly has been directed at 
the people that it claims to protect. People suspected of informing the authorities have had 
their ears and lips cut off, rape of women and men has been used as an act of humiliation to 
disrupt the cohesion of families, and massacres have been conducted in which the victims are 
often hacked and clubbed to death.135 Civilians have been killed for welcoming home returning 
(or deflecting) LRA soldiers, just as the acceptance of amnesties has resulted in random attacks 
on civilians.136 All acts which the ICC has established as grave breaches of international hu-
manitarian law.137 Though the LRA uses strong religious rhetoric and the attacks and plunder-
ing contribute to the group’s day-to-day survival, religion or greed are hardly the only motiva-
tions behind the violence. As Olsen argues, behind this violence, as arbitrary as it may seem, is 
a political rationale.  Olsen argues that although the LRA has not managed to gain control of 
the geographic areas they operate within and the goal of regaining central power has become 
ever more unrealistic, the violence is used as a means to gain social control138, thereby challeng-
ing the state’s monopoly of violence. As explained by Doom & Vlassenroot: “Each attack by the 
LRA is undermining the president’s position, because it is seen as a demonstration of his lack of power 
(…).”139As such, it is no longer a matter of winning the conflict, but rather undermining the le-
gitimacy of the government by not losing it.  
 
                                               
134 ICG 2008:4 
135 Doom & Vlassenroot 1999:1; 25-27 
136 In 2004 in IDP camp in Pagak, 17 mothers and their children were for instance hacked to death after having 
welcomed home returning LRA soldiers, just as a similar attack on an IDP camp in Lukodi in 2004 resulted in the 
killings of 28 people as a response to the increasing numbers of LRA soldiers accepting amnesty. (Allen 2006:76-
77) 
137 ICC 2005 
138 Olsen 2006:77-82 
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3.4 Summary: Conflict causes and dynamics  
Although many of the people in Northern Uganda and in the LRA define themselves as ethnic 
Acholi, the resistance is much more complex and goes well beyond ethnicity. The causes and 
underlying dynamics of the conflict can mainly be attributed to three things: 1) the socio-
economic division between Northern and Southern Uganda as a result of the British colonial 
administration’s division of labour, which effectively created a political elite in the South and a 
military ethnocracy in the North; 2) the militarization of politics in which the use of force has 
been a political means, as well as the exclusion of Acholi in all domains of political power; and 
finally 3) the regionalisation of the conflict, especially the influence of the GoS in the last dec-
ades of the conflict and the expansion of the conflict to surrounding countries.  
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4. Peace building and transitional justice initiatives in Uganda  
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the peace building initiatives in Uganda since 
President Museveni and the NRA seized power in 1986. This is followed by a presentation of 
the transitional justice processes that are currently part of the GoU’s peace building efforts to-
wards Northern Uganda, just as it includes some methodological considerations.  
 
4.1 Peace building efforts in Uganda from 1986-2009  
Throughout the conflict the GoU has pursued a dual strategy of military actions and mediation 
to bring peace to region.140 As a start, Museveni himself became President after breaching the 
Nairobi Peace Agreement signed on 17 December 1985. The ceasefire resulting from the peace 
agreement broke down almost immediately, when Museveni supported by the NRA marched 
into Kampala and seized power on 26 January 1986. However, these talks were quickly fol-
lowed by the new and more successful peace talks, now directed at UPDA and the remaining 
HSM forces that had emerged in response to Museveni’s regime. The Pece Agreement was 
signed on 3 June 1988 leading to the dismantling of UPDA/HSM coalition, but despite these 
efforts, war continued in Northern Uganda141; now between the HSM successor Josep Kony 
and LRA, which had incorporated opponents to the Pece Agreement from UPDA/ HSM 
forces.142  
 
As the war between the NRA and the LRA intensified, Museveni pursued a military strategy 
against the LRA during the early 1990s, which did lead to a drop in the intensity of the conflict 
during 1992-1993, eventually resulting in formal peace talks with the LRA in 1994. These talks 
are known as the Bigombe talks as the Acholi Minister for the North Betty Bigombe headed 
them.143 However, except from the Gulu Ceasefire signed on February 1994144, negotiations led 
nowhere but to military attacks. In 2002, the Ugandan army, now called the Uganda People’s 
Defense Force (UPDF) launched the first Iron Fist Offensive in an open alliance with SPLA. 
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It failed to resolve the situation once and for all, and in 2004, the more effective second Iron 
Fist Offensive was launched.145 However, neither managed to crush the LRA once and for all.  
 
During the last decade, however, it seems like things are about to change, as the urgency of 
finding a solution to the conflict (along with international pressure) increased. Firstly, President 
Museveni referred the situation in Northern Uganda to the International Criminal Court in 
2003, which, when the Bigombe negotiations faltered during the second half of 2005, led to ar-
rest warrants issued against Joseph Kony and four of his senior LRA leaders in 2005146. From a 
transitional justice perspective this was an important development as the peace building efforts 
so far had been pursued within the framework of the Amnesty Act of 2000 offering amnesty 
to all rebels engaged armed rebellion since 26 January 1986147. Furthermore, the ICC arrest 
warrants along changed regional dynamics paved the way for the Juba Peace Talks in July 2006.  
 
A significant factor giving impetus to the Juba Peace Talks in July 2006 in Juba, Sudan was the 
changed political dynamics in Southern Sudan, where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) from 2005 complicated the GoS’s support to the LRA. Additionally, both critics and 
supporters of the ICC arrest warrants tend to agree that in addition thereto, the ICC arrest 
warrants played a significant role in pressuring the LRA to the negotiating table by giving them 
an incentive to try to eliminate the indictments.148 The LRA leaders for whom the arrest war-
rants have been issued did not attend the Juba Peace Talks in person due to fear of being ar-
rested149, and were instead represented by Martin Ojul, the U.S.-based leader of the LRA dele-
gation150, which has caused critics to question whether the delegation, many of which were 
non-combatants and Acholi-exiles, was truly representative of the LRA.151 Nevertheless, de-
spite a rather hostile environment at the beginning of the peace talks, the parties agreed on a 
five-stage negotiating framework proposed by the mediators:  
1. Cessation of hostilities; 
2. Comprehensive solutions to the conflict;  
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3. Reconciliation and accountability;  
4. Formal ceasefire; 
5. Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR).152 
 
Despite the failure of Joseph Kony to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) on 18 April 2008, 
the Juba Peace Talks has resulted the signing of no less than five agreements: the Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement on 26 August 2006, the Agreement on Accountability and Reconcilia-
tion on 29 June 2007, the Agreement of Comprehensive Solutions on 22 February 2008, the 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Agreement in February 2008, and the 
Permanent Ceasefire on 23 February 2008 along with a number of addendums and annexures 
to the agreements. Along with the ICC arrest warrants; these agreements constitute the GoU’s 
current peace building efforts towards the conflict in Northern Uganda.  
 
4.2 Transitional justice in Uganda and methodological considerations 
While chapter 2 argues that long-term reconciliation and lasting peace is best achieved through 
the pursuit of a comprehensive transitional justice approach, it is therefore the purpose of this 
project to examine to what extent the transitional justice mechanisms in the GoU’s peace 
building efforts produce obstacles or incentives for peace. This also includes analysing the di-
lemmas of the pursuit of justice in the context of ongoing conflict. As the question of justice is 
often dealt with in post-conflict settings, Uganda is an interesting example of how transitional 
justice can be addressed as part of a peace building framework in the context of ongoing con-
flict. The analytical focus of the project is: 1) the GoU’s referral of the situation in Northern 
Uganda to the International Criminal Court in 2003 and its subsequent arrest warrants; 2) the 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation of 29 June 2007; and 3) the Agreement on 
Comprehensive Solutions of 2 May 2007 signed during the Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008). 
These three cases each represent different aspects of the transitional justice processes pursued 
by the GoU in its peace building efforts.  
 
The pursuit of international criminal justice is manifested in the referral of the situation in Northern 
Uganda to the ICC and its subsequent arrest warrants of the LRA leadership, just as the pursuit of na-
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tional criminal justice, traditional justice and non-criminal justice mechanisms including truth 
telling and reparations are manifested in the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation on 29 
June 2007 and its Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation on 19 February 2008. 
These two cases represent the conventional transitional justice mechanisms that seek to rectify 
past atrocities by holding the perpetrators accountable for their crimes, while simultaneously 
seeking to recognise the suffering of the victims through truth telling and reparations. These 
cases thus represent the back-ward looking transitional justice mechanisms that seek to right 
the wrong of the past.    
 
The third analytical focus of this project as manifested in the Agreement of Comprehensive Solutions 
on 22 February 2008 and its Implementation Protocol to the Agreement of Comprehensive Solutions on 22 
February 2008 represents the mechanisms established by the GoU to address the root causes of 
the conflict through political and economic reforms as well as its efforts to meet the needs of 
all survivors of the conflict, including the large number of IDPs. The case thus represents the 
forward-looking transitional justice mechanisms, which are particularly aimed at addressing the 
structural inequalities usually underpinning a conflict.  
 
The ceasefire and Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration will be in-
cluded in the analysis when of relevance, but are as such not part of the main focus areas.   
 
The analysis of this project will look  at a national policy level. Approaching the analysis, the 
theoretical framework of chapter 2 will be applied to the key policy documents addressing 
transitional justice as part of the GoU’s peace building efforts. To do this, a political and legal 
analysis of the identified transitional justice mechanisms will be carried out with the purpose of 
evaluating to what extent they provide obstacles or incentives for the GoU’s objective of 
bringing lasting peace and stability to Northern Uganda. While the analysis of the ICC includes 
the arrest warrants along with a number of press releases and speeches, the primary texts of 
analysis for the two other cases will be the principal agreements and the plans and protocols 
developed to support their implementation.  
 
Due to the timeframe of this project of six months, collecting empirical data through field re-
search in Uganda unfortunately has not been an option. Instead the project seeks to comple-
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ment the theoretical arguments drawing empirical knowledge from an extensive amount of 
primary and secondary literature. This includes amongst others legal texts, press releases, policy 
papers, news articles, NGO reports and academic reports of what has and is happening in 
Uganda. As secondary literature sometimes may have the limitation of having been processed 
by the author/s or biased in the direction of a certain organization’s agenda, some references 
date years back, many are for instance from before Joseph Kony failed to sign the Final Peace 
Agreement from the Juba Peace Talks, and hence, has a somewhat optimistic view on the 
prospects for the future. However, this will be addressed accordingly during the analysis.  
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5. The ICC and the arrest warrants of the LRA leadership 
The present chapter constitutes the first part of this project’s analysis, which looks into the di-
lemmas of the ICC arrest warrants of the five LRA leaders. To understand the context within 
which the court is operating this chapter presents will first include an introduction to the law 
of armed conflict, just as it introduces the legal framework and jurisdiction of the ICC and its 
relations to national judicial systems, including the principle of complementarity.   
 
5.1 The law of armed conflict   
The international law of armed conflict is divided into the two principles:  
 Jus ad bellum - the law on the use of force between states, 
 Jus in bello - the law in war.153 
 
Jus ad bellum are the rules that set out the circumstances of the use of force between states 
and are regulated by the UN Charter of 1945, while jus in bello are the rules applicable when 
armed conflict occurs, usually referred to as international humanitarian law, and regulated by 
the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and its two Protocols of 1977.154  
 
Jus ad bellum 
The main principle of jus ad bellum is the prohibition of armed conflict as stipulated in the 
UN Charter of 1945, article 2(4)155: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (…)”.156  
 
                                               
153 ICRC 2002:14 
154 DRK 2007:13-17 
155 Prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, the international community had on several occasions attempted to 
control and limit use of force as a means to settle disputes. The United Nation’s predecessor, the League of Na-
tions had been established as a result of the Treaty of Versailles 1919-1920 after World War I to prevent future 
wars. However, due to its lack of effective power it could only make recommendations, not binding resolutions. 
The trend continued in the Treaty of Paris of 1928 (also known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact), where 63 States con-
demned war as the solution to settling international disputes, but it was not until the UN Charter that a binding 
principle on the prohibition of use of force was established. (Taylor & Curtis 2005:406-407; Schabas 2001:604; 
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156 UN Charter 1945:2(4) 
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There are, however, exceptions to the main principle of the prohibition of the use of force be-
tween states, found in Chapter VII of the Charter. Firstly, article 42 allows that, if the “measures 
not involving the use of armed force”157 in article 41 are considered or proved inadequate “(…) action 
by air, sea, or land forces (…) may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations.”158 Secondly, there is the right to individual or collective self defense against an 
armed attack as stipulated in article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations (…).159 
 
A third exception to the UN Charter’s article 2(4) relates to those situations where an armed 
intervention is deemed necessary to avoid a humanitarian disaster as a result of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and other serious crimes and where the UN’s Secu-
rity Council cannot reach consensus for such an intervention. The right to humanitarian inter-
vention is, however, still vigorously disputed.160 
 
The legal body to settle disputes between states is the International Court of Justice, which 
Statute is annexed to the UN Charter.161  
 
Jus in bello 
When war occurs, whether legal or not (according to jus ad bellum), international humanitarian 
law (jus in bello) becomes applicable162. Jus in bello is governed by the four Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949 and its two Protocols of 1977 as amended and expanded after World 
War II.163  
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162 It was the first Geneva Convention of 1864 “Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the condition of the 
wounded in armies in the field” that laid the foundations for contemporary international humanitarian law. The 
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163 DRK 2007:18 
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The purpose of the Geneva Conventions is to protect people that no longer are part of the 
armed conflict such as the wounded and sick (Geneva Convention I + II), prisoners of war 
(Geneva Convention III), and civilians (Geneva Conventions IV). While the four Geneva 
Conventions regulate international armed conflict, Protocol II of 1977 of the conventions 
regulates internal armed conflicts, which is of particular importance to the situation in Uganda. 
One of the main principles of the Geneva Conventions is the principle of proportionality be-
tween the methods and the purpose of the use of armed force to create a balance between 
military necessity and humanity.164 
 
To ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions instruct 
states to establish effective criminal sanctions on persons who commit grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions in armed conflict such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and geno-
cide. Universal jurisdiction is applicable for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions as out-
lined in common article 3, which means that states are obliged to establish criminal sanctions 
for persons committing any of these crimes, whereas for other crimes they have the right but 
are not obliged to do so. Trials for grave breaches may take place at national or international 
courts. They should as a principle take place at national courts, but in reality states often ne-
glect this duty due to lack of political will, evidence or the like. This has contributed to the es-
tablishment of international courts such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals after World 
War II, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993, the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, and the International Criminal Court in 2002.165 
 
5.2 The International Criminal Court  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established on 1 July 2002, when the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court (herein after referred to as the Rome Statute) adopted 
on 17 July 1998, had obtained the required 60 ratifications for its entry into force. As of 21 July 
2009, 110 states had become parties to the Rome Statute166, including Uganda that had ratified 
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166 Senegal was the first to ratify on 2 February 1999 followed by Trinidad and Tobago two months later. (Schabas 
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the Rome Statute on 14 June 2002.167 The date of its entry into force is important in the re-
spect that the ICC cannot prosecute crimes committed prior to 1 July 2002, or for the individ-
ual state prior to the state’s ratification of the Rome Statute.168  
 
The ICC is a permanent institution granted with power to try and punish the most serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law.169 According to article 1 of the Rome Statute, the 
ICC “(…) shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of interna-
tional concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” 
The most serious crimes of international concern over which the court can exercise its jurisdic-
tion are as outlined in the Rome Statute’s article 5(1):   
 Genocide,  
 Crimes against humanity, 
 War crimes, 
 Crimes of aggression.170 
 
As referred to in article 1 and as emphasized in the preamble, the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction, which means that the ICC according to article 
17 of the Rome Statute only may proceed with a case when “the State is unwilling or unable genu-
inely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”.171 This is referred to as the principle of complemen-
tarity, although the wordings do not appear directly in the Rome Statute. The principle of 
complementarity is based on the recognition that the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction 
is not only a right, but also the duty of states172, as outlined in the preamble of the Rome Stat-
ute: “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes.”173 This is however often neglected by states, either due to their inability or unwilling-
ness to carry out this obligation174, which is why the Prosecutor in addition to state referrals 
can open investigations of situations on the basis of information on crimes that fall within its 
jurisdiction or if a case is referred to it by the UN Security Council under the UN Charter’s 
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Chapter VII.175 
 
A permanent international criminal tribunal as the ICC functions ultimately to hold perpetra-
tors accountable for breaching article 5. It has the possibility of conveying a clear message that 
the international community will not accept such atrocities, hereby potentially having a deter-
ring effect in the country in question or worldwide. Additionally, it is often better staffed and 
has the resources needed to carry out the expensive trials of high-level perpetrators. It has the 
potential of functioning on a basis of independence and impartiality compared to national judi-
cial systems that often emerge from conflict with shattered institutions and without the neces-
sary financial, judicial and administrative capacity to conduct impartial investigations and tri-
als176 and often are more vulnerable to manipulation from the ruling elite177. While international 
courts can work to advance the development and enforcement of international criminal norms, 
they also have the potential of standing a better chance than national courts of obtaining cus-
tody of perpetrators that have left the territory of the state. That being said, the fact the ICC is 
situated in The Hague, also means that it is less integrated in the national transitional justice 
process, it does not contribute to national judicial capacity building, just as it is difficult, not to 
say impossible for victims to attend the hearings and trials.178 
 
5.3 Referral of the situation in Northern Uganda and the arrests warrants  
On 16 December 2003, President Museveni took the decision to refer the situation in North-
ern Uganda to the Prosecutor of the ICC179 in accordance with article 13(a) of the Rome Stat-
ute: “The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 (…) if: (a) A situa-
tion in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State 
Party in accordance with article 14”180 and article 14, which outlines the circumstances in which a 
state can make referrals for the ICC for further investigations:   
A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the 
purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of 
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such crimes.181 
 
On 29 July 2004, more than seven months after the referral, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced in a press release that he had found “reasonable basis to open an 
investigation into the situation concerning Northern Uganda”.182 This was based on credible evidence 
that systematic and widespread attacks committed against civilians including abduction, rape, 
torture, child conscription and continued displacement. Ocampo assembled a team of 12 in-
vestigators and lawyers who conducted more than 50 visits to Uganda to gather evidence. 
Some 20 missions were also held to meet with Acholi traditional and religious leaders183, just as 
a delegation of Acholi traditional and religious leaders travelled to The Hague to meet Ocampo 
in March 2005. These interactions is said to have had the effect of casting the traditional lead-
ers as the intermediaries between the victimized population and the ICC184, with the potential 
of bolstering both the leaders and the ICC’s legitimacy among the people in Northern Uganda 
of which only 27 % in 2005 had heard of the ICC.185 This number did however increase to 60 
% in 2007; primarily through information in radio broadcasts.186 
 
When the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II unsealed its arrest warrants on 13 October 2005, they 
were directed at five senior LRA leaders for crimes against humanity and war crimes commit-
ted in Uganda since 1 July 2002. The arrest warrants were the first to be issued by the ICC and 
were directed at Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo Dominic Ongwen, and Raska 
Lukwiya187. The proceedings against Raska Lukwiya were terminated on 11 July 2007, when it 
was confirmed that he was killed on 12 August 2006. The arrest warrant was therefore ren-
dered without effect and Lukwiya’s name has been removed from the case.188 Assumably, Vin-
cent Otti, Deputy Commander of the LRA died on 8 October 2007. Mr. Machar, who medi-
ated the Juba Peace Talks, was officially informed hereof by Kony.189 However, his case is still 
active, which is most likely because his not death has been documented.  
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Joseph Kony is charged with 33 accounts of war crimes and crimes against humanity alone. 
The war crimes190 charges include inducing of rape, attacks against the civilian population, 
enlisting of children in the armed forces, cruel treatment, pillaging and murder. The crimes 
against humanity191 charges include sexual enslavement, rape, enslavement, murder and inhu-
mane acts.192 The other three indictments are based on charges of a total of 49 similar accounts 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity (Vincent Otti 32; Okot Odhiambo 10; Dominic 
Ongwen 7).193 In most of the cases, the accused are being charged with having ordered the 
crimes, rather than having committed them.  
 
5.4 Impartiality of the ICC  
A key point of criticism of the ICC arrests warrants is that they are issued against LRA leaders 
only; hence not charging crimes committed by government forces. Not surprisingly, President 
Museveni had solely emphasized crimes committed by the LRA, when he referred the situation 
in Uganda to the ICC, but Ocampo soon responded that the ICC would interpret the referral 
as concerning all crimes under the Rome Statute committed in Northern Uganda194; hereby 
leaving open the possibility of investigating alleged atrocities committed by the UPDF and 
LDU.  
 
The subsequent arrest warrants for the LRA leadership only, while disregarding crimes com-
mitted by the UPDF and LDU leaves an impression of the ICC as partial and politicized, in 
contrast to being an independent and impartial institution. Although Ocampo has emphasized 
that the ICC may investigate UPDF crimes in future, it is unlikely to do so, as the ICC’s pres-
ence in Uganda and its relationship with key Ugandan Officials relies on the good will of the 
Ugandan government. Phil Clark, a Research Fellow at University of Oxford and the co-
founder of the Oxford Transitional Justice Group, even argues that he was told by a govern-
ment official that Ocampo himself had approached Museveni in 2003 and persuaded him to 
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refer the case to the ICC, as the referral suited both sides “providing the ICC with its first state refer-
ral of a case and the Ugandan government with another stick with which to beat the LRA”.195  
 
The grounds on which the ICC has opened the case against the LRA further the view that the 
ICC is just another stick to beat the LRA with. Uganda is either “unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution” as outlined in article 17(1) of the Rome Statute196. The case 
instead appears to be referred to the ICC based on the inability of the UPDF and the Ugandan 
police to capture and arrest the LRA leadership. Clark states that the Ugandan judiciary “one of 
the most proficient and robust in Africa – is unquestionably able and willing to prosecute serious cases such as 
those involving those of the LRA”. He further argues that Ocampo so far has failed to explain the 
prosecutorial strategy in Uganda, which further adds to the perception that the arrest warrants 
suited both the ICC and the GoU, as it remains a fact that the ICC neither has military nor po-
lice capacity to carry out the arrests.197 However, and as argued by Kritz, an international court 
might have a better chance of getting the suspects in custody198 than the GoU who has to rely 
on the cooperation of governments with which they might have tense relationship, i.e. Sudan.  
 
Museveni’s referral to the ICC might also be a signal to the international community and to the 
people in Uganda of a genuine interest in ending impunity in Uganda once and for all; how-
ever, this remains questionable when he did not refer the crimes committed by the government 
forces.  
 
Ocampo however justifies the current focus on crimes committed by the LRA by arguing that 
these constitute the gravest atrocities committed in Northern Uganda.199 In Ocampo’s state-
ment at the press conference on ICC’s arrest warrants on the LRA leaders, he said that:  
The criteria for selection of the first case was gravity. We analyzed the gravity of all crimes in Northern 
Uganda committed by the LRA and Ugandan forces. Crimes committed by the LRA were much more 
numerous and of much higher gravity than alleged crimes committed by the UPDF.  We therefore started 
with an investigation of the LRA.200  
  
                                               
195 Clark 2008:42-43 
196 Rome Statute 2002:17(1) 
197 Clark 2008:43 
198 Kritz 1996:129 
199 Clark 2008:42-43 
200 Ocampo 2005:3 
 46 
However, local as well as international human rights groups have reported regular and grave 
atrocities committed by the UPDF in Northern Uganda, especially in the IDP camps. A study 
conducted by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2005 reports that in every IDP camp visited, 
HRW found cases of abuse by the LRA but also by UPDF soldiers. UPDF-administered beat-
ings of civilians were extremely commonplace, but the killing of civilians, sometimes inside the 
camps, was also documented.201 A survey conducted by Pham et al. in 2007, reports that as 
many as 6.1 % of the respondents have been beaten, 3 % (5 % among women) have been 
sexually violated, and 3 % have had a family member killed by UPDF soldiers202. The extent of 
the atrocities are not as high as for LRA abuses203, but does point to the fact that war crimes 
and crimes against humanity have been committed by government forces, who are widely held 
unaccountable for their actions.  
 
The impartiality of the arrest warrants highlights a dilemma in the pursuit of international jus-
tice more generally, as similar issues have previously been symptomatic for interntional interna-
tional criminal tribunals. An example is the ICTR’s investigation and prosecutions of crimes 
committed during the genocide in Rwanda 1994. Here it was only the crimes committed by the 
ethnic group the Hutus (the ethnic group that held power and ordered the genocide) that were 
being investigated by the court, and not the crimes committed by the ethnic group the Tutsis 
and the Rwanda Patriotic Front, who were alleged to have committed war crimes in their fight 
against the government army and who after seizing power were alleged to have committed re-
taliation attacks on Hutu refugees in DRC.204 As in Uganda, the court’s investigations relied 
heavily on the good will of the government to gain access to government files to carry out the 
investigation, which throughout had seen ICTR as an imposition.205 This has caused the ICTR 
to be regarded as victor’s justice among the people in Rwanda206, which was also the case for 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals in the post-World War II Period, as discussed in para-
graph 2.1 looking into transitional justice in a historical perspective. 
 
                                               
201 HRW 2005:15 
202 Other crimes by UPDF documented were verbally abused or threatened (13.6 %), property stolen/destroyed 
(8.6 %), productive assets taken away (6.5 %), family members maimed or injured (3.5 %) and restricted of mov-
ing (3.4 %). (Pham et al. 2007:30) 
203 Pham et al. 2007:28-30 
204 Meyerstein 2007:494 
205 Kritz 1997:146 
206 Messell 2004:99 
  47 
As for Uganda, the ICC partly appears to have based its case on the gravity of the crimes 
committed, and partly on a desire to avoid prosecuting government officials, upon whom 
court representatives rely for security and evidence. This highly compromises the legitimacy of 
the ICC as an independent impartial body to enhance the enforcement of international hu-
manitarian law in the eyes of the Ugandan population that is already sceptical of the court’s 
apparent unwillingness to address government crimes. The failure to effectuate the arrest war-
rants by capturing the LRA leadership, moreover, undermines the legitimacy. A common view 
among traditional leaders and the political opposition in Uganda is that the ICC has become 
just another tool of Museveni.207 
 
What at first glance looked as an easy case to the ICC might have proved to undermine its le-
gitimacy as the bias towards LRA leaders questions its impartiality and ability to carry out its 
functions without support from the GoU just as it has not yet managed to effectuate its arrests 
warrants. Holding senior leaders accountable for ordering and committing crimes in breach 
with international humanitarian law is crucial in addressing a long history of impunity in 
Uganda. Though it is not possible (nor the purpose) for the ICC to press charges against every 
soldier in the LRA and UPDF, who have breached international humanitarian law (this is a 
task for the Ugandan national judicial system), it is crucial that all are equal in front or the law, 
regardless of affiliation. Additionally, the potential genuine interest from Museveni to end the 
legacy of impunity in Uganda and hereby enhance the rule of law, has proven to be just an-
other stick with which to beat the LRA.  
 
5.5 The ICC arrest warrants – An obstacle to achieving peace?  
Despite the ICC’s bias towards the LRA leadership, the court’s arrest warrants were soon 
hailed a success, as it was said to bring the LRA back to the negotiating table during the Juba 
Peace Talks in July 2006.208 Many considered the Juba Peace Talks the best opportunity for 
achieving peace and ending 20 years of conflict, as they soon led to the signing of the Cessa-
tion of Hostilities Agreement on 26 August 2006, which has brought relative peace to re-
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gion209.  
 
The ICC arrest warrants however soon proved to be a potential obstacle to the peace talks, as 
the LRA leaders unsurprisingly demanded the withdrawal of the ICC arrest warrants as a pre-
condition for the final settlements and instead suggested that they be subject to traditional jus-
tice mechanisms.210 Kony never showed up to sign the FPA on 18 April 2008 due to fear of 
being arrested, and a recent report from VOA News says that Kony has declared the Juba 
Peace Talks dead by demanding new peace talks including guarantees from the GoU to protect 
him from the ICC arrest warrant.211 As ICTJ argues, there will always be a strong pressure to 
take the threat of prosecutions of the table early in a peace process as combatants at all levels 
have a tremendous interest in seeking amnesty212, and given the legacy of impunity in Uganda, 
where amnesties have been used as a political tool in previous attempts to establish peace, this 
demand was not unexpected. President Museveni had from the beginning been unclear on the 
issue, particular in the early day of the peace talks when he spoke of providing a blanket am-
nesty to the leadership213, just as he initially requested Ocampo to withdraw the charges. Pro-
viding a blanket amnesty to LRA leadership is not an option; three other possible options to 
withdraw the arrest warrants are however available in the Rome Statute, each of which will be 
discussed in the following.  
 
The first option is for the UN Security Council to invoke article 16 of the Rome Statute in a 
UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution and order a deferral of the prosecutions up to 12 
months in the interest of promoting international peace and security under article VII of the 
UN Charter.214 However, as argued by Schabas, it is unlikely that the LRA might find a suspen-
sion of the arrest warrants under article 16 sufficient, as they most likely would  want to secure 
a more permanent guarantee of impunity to lay down their arms.215 
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Another option would be to invoke article 53 of the Rome Statute under which the prosecutor 
has discretion to stop prosecutions when “taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests 
of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests 
of justice”216 Article 53 can only be used to end, not suspend the case. It is however the purpose 
of the ICC to end impunity and ensure prosecution of those most responsible of the gravest 
crimes as stated in the preamble to the Rome Statute: It is consequently not plausible that the 
decision to prosecute the LRA leaders will be withdrawn, as this contradict the court’s core 
principles217.  
 
A third option would be for Museveni to invoke the principle of complementary in article 17 
of the Rome Statute, which clearly states that “a case will be inadmissible if it is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution”218. Challenges to the principle of admissibility may be either “prior to 
or at the commencement of the trial”219. While Museveni in the early days of the Juba Peace Talks 
had promised an amnesty to the LRA leaders, it is clear that a blanket amnesty would not be an 
option. Providing a blanket amnesty would indicate unwillingness to investigate and prosecute, 
and therefore not qualify as a challenge to the case’s admissibility at the ICC. Before the refer-
ral to the ICC, the GoU had passed the Amnesty Act of 2000 providing a blanket amnesty to 
rebels who surrendered to the government220: 
(…) any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in 
war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda” stating that such a person 
“shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment for the participation in the war or re-
bellion for any crime committed in the cause of the war or armed rebellion”.221  
 
However, the Amnesty Act cannot be invoked for two reasons. Firstly, the ICC exercises uni-
versal jurisdiction over the crimes listed in article 5 of the Rome Statute, which has supremacy 
over Uganda’s Amnesty Act. Secondly, the Amnesty Act was amended on 18 April 2006 to ex-
clude the LRA leadership. However, to be able to meet the LRA leaders’ demand of with-
drawal of the ICC arrest warrants and invoke the principle of complementarity, local tradi-
tional justice mechanisms have been suggested by the LRA and other actors as a possible al-
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ternative, while others suggest more formal national judicial mechanisms instead222. This stems 
from a frequent criticism that international justice cannot be imposed by universal decree. 
Rather it should be pursued through locally grounded and socially accepted mechanisms, such 
as traditional justice mechanisms.223 These options will be discussed further in paragraph 5.2 
analyzing the impact of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation of 29 June 2007.  
 
It can as such be argued that the ICC arrest warrants has jeopardized prospects for peace 
through the Juba Peace Talks. Advocates of this issue argue that peace must be established be-
fore justice can be pursued. This argument is best encapsulated in the title of the Refugee Law 
Project from 2005 “Peace First, Justice Later” in which it is argued that “peace is a precondition for 
justice”224 and that “peace needs to be secured before justice can be decided upon and carried out”225 as “there 
can be no meaningful justice while civilians continue to be caught in the middle of a vicious battle between the 
LRA and government forces”.226  
 
The Rome Statute does take into account the dilemma of balancing the pursuit of peace and 
justice, but its current caseload with arrest warrants and trials issued against perpetrators in the 
conflicts in DRC, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Uganda227 illustrates its likeliness to 
pursue justice and seek to prevent ongoing crimes simultaneously. Although, and as argued by 
the ICTJ, it might be to early to conclude whether criminal justice through the ICC and peace 
negations can be pursued on parallel tracks, Ocampo has throughout the Juba Peace Talks 
maintained, that it is possible for peace processes and arrest warrants to be proceeded at the 
same time, but also argues that the arrest warrants should not be seen as a stand-alone option, 
but rather as a component of a comprehensive solution to the conflict.228  
 
Opponents to the “peace first, justice later” approach, as represented by international human 
rights organizations argue that accountability and justice is in fact not an obstacle, but rather a 
precondition for long-term reconciliation and peace. Human Rights Watch is very explicit on 
                                               
222 ICTJ 2007:9-10 
223 Allen 2008:47 
224 RLP 2005:1 
225 Ibid.:32 
226 Ibid.:50 
227 ICC 2009a 
228 ICTJ 2007:6 
  51 
this issue, and sums up some of the main theoretical arguments in favour of retributive justice, 
as: 
Accountability and justice are not inherently inimical to peace. In fact, the converse is true: long-term 
peace and stability cannot be achievable in an environment of impunity. Accountability for gross violations 
of human rights and justice for the victims of such violations comprises a strong foundation upon which 
peace and stability are built. Perpetrators of crimes that go unpunished are likely to commit crimes in the 
future, particularly those who are able to achieve positions of power. Individual and communal acts of re-
venge as a result of the lack of government prosecution and in the face of government rewards to the per-
secutors would threaten the peace. The ICC could play a central role by ensuring that accountability and 
justice are present in the peace and reconstruction process in northern Uganda (…).229 
 
And as simply phrased by the International Crisis Group (ICG): “Peace deals without accountability 
have generally not worked in Uganda”.230 
 
Although the ICC has not yet managed to hold anyone accountable for their atrocities, the de-
terrent effect on society is the key objective. Kritz argues, “criminal justice in some form must remain 
a threat and reality”231, an argument that Ocampo also has adopted. In his opening statement to 
the fifth Session of the Assembly of State Parties, he said that “while the four remaining LRA 
commanders are still at large, the Court has made a significant impact on ground. This case shows how arrest 
warrants issued by the Court can contribute to the prevention of atrocious crimes”, as the LRA has been 
forced to flee their safe haven making their conducts more difficult.232 It is in this context 
worth noting that if a peace process always trumps the threat of prosecution, then the deter-
rent effect of criminal justice on society, as advocated by Teitel and Kritz will be fundamentally 
compromised.  
 
5.6 Summary  
A permanent international criminal court as the ICC has the potential of conducting its func-
tions in an impartial and independent manner. However, with its arrest warrants issued against 
the LRA leadership only, and not the government forces in the UPDF and the LDU, highly 
compromises its legitimacy and makes it dependent on the good will of the GoU. Additionally, 
what could have been a genuine interest by President Museveni to once and for all end impu-
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nity in Uganda; hereby enhancing the rule of law has proven to be just another political tool 
with which the GoU can beat the LRA.  
 
The ICC arrest warrants have furthermore proven an obstacle to get the LRA leaders to sign 
the Final Peace Agreement demanding the arrest warrants withdrawn. Arguments such as 
“peace first, justice later” have become an obstacle to peace. However, letting peace get in the 
way of justice would only contribute to legitimizing the violent conduct of the LRA, just as it 
would highly undermine the legitimacy of the ICC and question its ability to carry out its func-
tions, just as the deterrent effects of the court would be lost. As regrettable as it is that the ICC 
has not managed to effectuate its arrest warrants, the only possible solution for a withdrawal 
would be for Museveni to invoke the principle of complementarity by proving that the GoU is 
both willing and able to carry out the investigations and prosecution at national courts or as 
part of a traditional justice scheme, which will be further in the following chapter.  
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6. The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation   
This chapter constitutes the second part of this project’s analysis, which focuses on national 
transitional justice mechanisms as established in the Agreement on Accountability and Recon-
ciliation of 29 June 2007. This chapter addresses the dilemmas of the national criminal justice 
system and the local traditional conflict resolution ceremonies, truth telling and reparations as 
suggested in the agreement and their influence on the prospects for peace.  
 
6.1 Approaching an the agreement   
During the Juba Peace Talks, there was widespread debate in Uganda on what kind of justice 
mechanisms that should be incorporated into the agreements of the Juba Peace Talks. Ac-
countability and reconciliation were addressed under agenda item 3 in the Juba Peace Talks to 
which both parties to the conflict were quick to issue position papers. The first government 
paper proposed ways in which LRA soldiers responsible for atrocities could be reintegrated 
into society through the local conflict resolution ceremony Mato Oput and through amnesty, 
while the LRA expressed the need for accountability for crimes committed by the government 
forces, just as it demanded that the GoU to accept responsibility for causing the conflict. 
Moreover, the LRA demanded the establishment of traditional justice, a truth and reconcilia-
tion commission as well as compensation mechanisms. Finally, the LRA emphasized the need 
for addressing the root causes of the conflict. Throughout the discussions, the ICC continued 
to emphasize Uganda’s international legal obligations under the Rome Statute, just as delegates 
emphasized that traditional justice mechanisms should run in parallel to national criminal jus-
tice rather than as an alternative thereto. The ICC moreover recommended capacity building 
of national criminal justice mechanisms to comply with international humanitarian law as 
manifested in the ICC and the Rome Statute. 233  
 
The negotiations on agenda item 3 paved the way for two agreements:  
1. The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation on 29 June 2007 that outlines the 
framework for accountability and reconciliation, and  
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2. The Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation on 18 February 
2008 that constitutes the implementation framework to the principal agreement.  
 
These agreements constitute the overall framework bridging the demands of accountability and 
reconciliation and reflect demands put forth by both sides of the conflict. Hence, the principal 
agreement provides for the establishment of national criminal justice, traditional justice, truth 
telling mechanisms and a reparations scheme, while the annexure provides for the implementa-
tion of these. Each of these mechanisms will be discussed in more details in the following.  
 
6.2 National criminal justice: a special division of the High Court 
The ICC’s involvement in Uganda has led to increased focus on prosecution of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity domestically during the Juba Peace Talks. During the discussions on 
the subject of national criminal justice prior to the signing of the agreements, the parties agreed 
that crimes under international humanitarian law, such as war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity were not adequately addressed in Ugandan law, and agreed on the need to adjust or 
pass new national legislation accordingly to meet the threshold of complementarity under the 
Rome Statute.234 This is reflected in the preamble of the Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation where the parties agree to be:  
Committed to preventing impunity and promoting redress in accordance with the Constitution and in-
ternational obligations and recalling, in this connection, the requirements of the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) and in particular the principle of complementarity.235 
 
Furthermore, article 6 of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation reflects this 
commitment and provides for the establishment of national criminal justice: 
Formal courts provided for under the Constitution shall exercise jurisdiction over individuals who are al-
leged to bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes amounting to inter-
national crimes, during the course of conflict. Provided that State actors shall be subjected to existing 
criminal justice processes and not to special justice processes under this Agreement.”236  
 
For this purpose, the Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation pro-
vides for the establishment of a special division of Uganda’s High Court to prosecute “those who 
are alleged to have planned or carried out widespread, systematic, or serious attacks directed against civilians or 
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who are alleged to have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions”237, just as a special investiga-
tion unit shall identify individuals who are alleged to have planned or carried out “widespread, 
systematic, or serious attacks directed against civilians”238.  
 
Uganda’s Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) is actively developing a transitional justice 
strategy in accordance to these agreements.239 Soon after the Annexure was signed, the GoU 
established a 50 member-working group consisting of government stakeholders and civil soci-
ety representatives and Acholi elders. It has five sub-committees: 1) court and legal mecha-
nisms, 2) traditional justice mechanisms, 3) truth telling body, 4) budget and finance, and fi-
nally 5) harmonization between instruments. Its first task was considering the legal and admin-
istrative preparations for setting up the special division of the High Court.240 In early August 
2009, two weeks of nation-wide consultations about domesticating the Rome Statute and set-
ting up the special division of the High Court was concluded.241 However, even though re-
sources are already being allocated242, judges and a registrar have been appointed, legislation to 
establish the division of the High Court and amend Uganda’s law to allow prosecution of in-
ternational crimes is still pending243.  
 
The inclusion of conventional means of criminal justice in the peace process is crucial in end-
ing a long history of impunity in Uganda. Not only can accountability for the perpetrators of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity provide justice to the victims, but improvements of 
the domestic judicial system and processes may also help rebuild trust in the state institutions 
and enhance the rule of law, hereby sending a signal to the people of Uganda of a return to 
stability. However, for this to be a possibility, it is crucial that the new legal justice regime is 
not just manipulated to suit Museveni to either avoid prosecuting crimes committed by gov-
ernment forces or to get around the ICC indictments.  
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The special division of the High Court and the principle of complementarity  
If Museveni, with the establishment of the special division of the High Court, intennded to in-
voke the principle of complementarity by prosecuting the four LRA leaders for whom arrest 
warrants have been issued by the ICC, the main challenge for the national criminal system will 
be to satisfy international standards and convince the ICC that the four LRA leaders will in 
fact be tried. Legal practice and procedures in Uganda, although hailed to be one of the most 
robust in Africa, do not always conform to international trial standards with incidences of tor-
ture of detainees, admission of evidence obtained by torture and inadequate guarantees for dis-
closure of relevant material to defense.244  
 
The Rome Statute moreover requires that states are willing or genuinely able to investigate or 
prosecute, but is silent on the requirements for punishments for those found guilty. Another 
challenge will be to ensure proportionality between the crimes committed, recognizing the suf-
fering of the victims and showing a genuine willingness to enforce international humanitarian 
law. For this purpose, article 6 of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, states 
that new legislation “shall introduce a regime of alternative penalties and sanctions”, which “shall, as rele-
vant reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations”.245 The drafting of the legislation for the special divi-
sion of the High Court is still pending, although it was decided at Juba that there would be no 
capital punishment246. 
 
Uganda could learn from similar experiences in other countries such as Colombia, where the 
Uribe administration that came to power in 2002, it drafted a Peace and Justice Law scheme 
that reckons with perpetrators from its long running conflict in a way so that it precludes ICC 
prosecutions. In its current form the scheme provides for reduced sentences (five to eight 
years) to ex-paramilitaries in exchange for a full and complete disclosure of crimes. This may 
show a genuine willingness to end impunity in Colombia, but much depends on whether it will 
actually be implemented. Currently, there are no effective measures in place to protect the wit-
nesses and victims just as the prosecutor’s office remains under-resourced.247   
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Implementing and developing transitional justice mechanisms is an expensive affair and re-
source mobilisation is a general problem for developing countries that often rely on donor 
funding. It is for instance worth noting the high costs that are usually connected to trials of 
high-level perpetrators. In Sierra Leona for example, $31 million were spent per perpetrator 
tried in front of the Special Court in Sierra Leone248. Compared to national prosecutions, inter-
national criminal courts, such as the ICC, are more likely to have the necessary human and ma-
terial resources at its disposal relative to an often shattered judicial system of a country emerg-
ing from mass atrocities, just as it is more likely to be staffed by experts.249 
 
As noted by the Human Right Watch, the intention with the establishment of the special divi-
sion of the High Court is not to prosecute all the perpetrators of the conflict, but rather only 
to prosecute the ICC suspects.250 The agreement does however not limit its mandate to prose-
cuting the LRA leadership only, but on the other hand, it does not specify who it intends to 
prosecute either. There are no provisions in the agreements prohibiting amnesties for crimes 
under international humanitarian law and they appear to leave in place the amnesties granted 
by the Amnesty Act of 2000251, which may imply that its jurisdiction will not be applied more 
broadly to other perpetrators. Additionally, while the ICC has not sought arrest warrants for 
atrocities committed by the army, military courts are not included in the Agreement on Ac-
countability and Reconciliation either. The government insists that it has dealt with crimes 
committed by the government force by courts martial and consequent executions. However, as 
argued by the ICG:  
The lack of judicial follow-up for army crimes coupled with the fear of victims to report them and the 
exclusion of military courts from the judicial mechanisms listed in the Juba protocols amount to guaran-
teed impunity for senior military, even if common soldiers were quietly court-martialled and executed.252 
 
If it the case, that senior military leaders from the UPDF walk free of investigation and prose-
cutions, is would significantly undermine the civic trust in the military just as it would risk un-
dermining the public trust in the government, particular in a population that already feel be-
trayed by the lack of government protection. A longer term consequent could moreover be a 
return to violence and hostilities, and if discrimination of the LRA’s crimes continues, it is 
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unlike that Uganda will move advance from a situation of negative peace. To move in a direc-
tion towards positive peace, the GoU will need to deal with the discriminating and biased 
prosecutorial strategy. The question is then whom and how many to prosecute.  
 
International law does not demand the prosecution of every individual implicated in the atroci-
ties, although it does demand that all stand equal in front of the law and that prosecutions are 
not arbitrary or implemented in a discriminating manner. A symbolic or representative number 
of prosecutions of those most responsible may satisfy international obligations. As Kritz ar-
gues, it may be useful to distinguish between different categories of offences: 1) the leaders 
who gave the orders to commit war crimes and those who actually carried out the worst of-
fences, which is the smallest category numerically; 2) those who perpetrated abuses not rising 
to the first category; and 3) those whose offences were minimal. Punishment will then be de-
cided accordingly.253 The RPF government in Rwanda used a similar strategy after the genocide 
in 1994, where it divided the perpetrators into four categories, where category one offenders 
are tried at the ad hoc criminal tribunal ICTR or a court of first instance, while offenders in 
category two and three are tried in institutionalized traditional justice courts (the Gacaca 
courts), while offenders in category four are not punished.254 Rwanda’s strategy can however 
hardly be recommended, as the RPF chose to prosecute almost everybody involved in the 
genocide, a strategy far to extensive for its weak and limited national judicial system. In most 
cases, given the often large number of alleged perpetrators combined with limited capacity of 
national and international courts, trials will often be limited to category one and parts of cate-
gory two. As argued by Kritz, offenders in category one will “need to be held accountable for prosecu-
tion to provide a comprehensive sense of justice”.255 Categorizing the others may be more difficult as 
many of the perpetrators are victims themselves, having been abducted into the ranks of the 
LRA and forces to be part of the atrocities. For the same reason, many NGOs and traditional 
leaders sin Uganda support that the Amnesty Act remains in effect and that traditional justice 
mechanisms are promoted to welcome home former abductees256.   
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In Uganda, this means that as a minimum both the LRA leadership as well as the senior mili-
tary leadership should be tried, either at an international or domestic court. While the ICC has 
the comparative advantage of having more resources and experts available, trying the LRA and 
senior military leadership at a new special division of the High Court will contribute to enhanc-
ing the legitimacy of the GoU and enhance the rule of law, as it may demonstrate its ability to 
hold individuals accountable for their crimes and showing that all are equal in front of the law. 
This is crucial for the people of Uganda to gain or regain trust in the institutions, hereby in-
creasing the likeliness of long-term national reconciliation and the establishment of positive 
peace. Only time will tell, if the new legislative regime will enable a move in this direction.  
 
6.3 Traditional justice 
In addition to the establishment of a special division of the High Court, the framework of the 
Agreement of Accountability and Reconciliation and its Annexure also provides for the pro-
motion of traditional justice mechanisms to be part of the accountability and reconciliation 
framework. As outlined in article 3.1: 
Traditional Justice mechanisms, such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc and Tonu ci Koka 
and others as practiced in the communities affected by conflict shall be promoted, with necessary modi-
fications, as part of a central part of the framework.257 
 
The Annexure moreover states that the traditional justice mechanisms “shall form a central part of 
the alternative justice and reconciliation framework”258 which includes alternative sentences, repara-
tions, and truth seeking efforts.259 However, as stated in the agreement these are “not currently 
being administered in the formal courts”260. 
 
NGOs, traditional and religious leaders, government officials, as well as the LRA have increas-
ingly promoted traditional justice mechanisms as an important part of a conflict resolution 
strategy in Uganda. Up until the Juba Peace Talks, it was mainly the Acholi ritual Mato Oput 
that had gained ground, but in the Agreement of Accountability and Reconciliation other ritu-
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als “to reconcile parties formerly in conflict, after full accountability”261 have been included to reflect tra-
ditions of Lango, Teso, Madi and Ankole as well. 262  
 
Pursuing traditional justice  
Traditional justice mechanisms date back to the indigenous governance system of pre-colonial 
Uganda, where these mechanisms were the source of principle governance headed by the 
chiefs (rwodi). The rwodi were guided by the democratically elected Council of Elders who 
had seats in the Grand Council that “made laws and took decisions in the form of religious injunctions to 
be observed and implemented by the members of the Acholi society for their own good, akin to the functions of 
judiciary, parliament and executive in ‘modern’ government systems”. The British colonial administration 
stripped the chiefs of their political power, replacing them with colonial administrators, and 
traditional chiefs were not officially recognized again until 1995, when a constitutional reform 
attempted to restore their position in society as providers and guides of their people, but their 
role remain severely weakened.263  
 
Although the procedures of traditional justice practices vary considerably between the different 
regions of Uganda, the Refugee Law Project has identified five principles and elements that are 
at the center of traditional justice practices in Northern Uganda: 1) material compensation, also 
referred to as reparation; 2) reconciliation and forgiveness; 3) truth telling and responsibility; 4) 
cleansing and welcoming; and finally 5) punishment. These elements were in various combina-
tions used to address a variety of crimes ranging from intentional killing, adultery and absence 
from community. Such processes usually would begin with a cleansing ritual if the person had 
been absent from community, or with some form of retributive measure if the person had 
been caught in the act of a crime. Following either of these two practices, a process of truth 
telling would commence to discuss the events and to take responsibility for the actions com-
mitted. The dialogue would help determine specific material compensation as a form of repara-
tion to the victim/s. Then finally, a ceremony, which expressed the achievement of reconcilia-
tion and forgiveness, would take place, producing a normalization of relations.264  
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In the Mato Oput ritual, the offender and the next of kin of the killed person would drink ex-
tracts of the root of the tree Oput from the same vessel, while women from both clans shout 
the war cries. The members of the two families join and simultaneous drink from the vessel, 
while the master of the ceremony cut of the head of a bull brought by the killer, and cut of the 
head of a goat brought be the next of kin of the killed. The bull’s head is ceremoniously 
handed over to next of kin of the killed, while the goat’s head is given to the offender. The 
meat of the bull is then cooked and eaten together, and from this point, the Acholi people can 
continue their normal social conduct. The cleansing rituals that sometimes precede Mato Oput 
can be used single-handedly to welcome home a family member that has been away from 
homestead for an extended period of time.265  
 
Western retributive justice versus local restorative justice 
During the Juba Peace Talks, when Kony demanded the withdrawal of the ICC arrest warrants 
as a precondition for signing the FPA, Kony suggested that he and the three other LRA lead-
ers would be subject to traditional justice “understandably finding the idea of some kind of reconciliation 
ritual more appealing than criminal prosecution”266. The traditional justice rituals are however unlikely 
to meet the threshold of complementarity as set out in the Rome Statute267, firstly as it is not 
part of any formal institutional setting, and secondly, it would hardly satisfy the requirement of 
investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators.  
 
The revival of traditional justice in Northern Uganda has nevertheless sparked debates about 
which forms of justice are appropriate in a Ugandan context. Much of the discourse has cen-
tered on the argument that it is inappropriate to impose Western retributive justice on a local 
population that is more interested in restorative forms of local justice. The main argument by 
advocates of traditional justice is that justice cannot be imposed by universal decree, but in-
stead needs to be locally rooted. A prominent proponent of this view is Zachery Lomo, for-
merly part of the Refugee Project who in his article on why the ICC must withdraw its arrest 
warrants suggested that:  
(…) the people of northern Uganda have the right to self-determination, and this implies the primary 
prerogative of determining how to end the conflict in northern Uganda. If they decide that the best way 
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to deal with their past is to forgive all those who have committed crimes against civilians, that wish has 
to be respected by others, including the ICC. If they decide that those who were responsible for the vio-
lation of human rights should be dealt with in accordance with their own traditions, that too has to be 
respected by all who do not share the values of the people affected. To impose on them an approach 
that negates prospects of ending the conflict and addressing its root causes, primarily because we want 
to punish impunity, is in itself an act of impunity, an insult, and a violation of the peoples' right to self-
determination.268 
 
Advocates of traditional justice unsurprisingly include the LRA, local and international NGOs, 
and traditional and religious leaders of Northern Uganda, who prior to the ICC involvement in 
Uganda and the Juba Peace Talks had both lobbied for the Amnesty Act of 2000 and pro-
moted traditional justice as a means of welcoming home former abductees.269  
 
Opponents argue that the role of traditional justice among the people in Northern Uganda has 
been over-emphasized. The most prominent on this argument is probably Tim Allen, a reader 
in Development Studies at the London School of Economics and the author of among other 
publications the book from 2004 “Trial Justice – The International Criminal Court and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army” and the more recently article “Ritual (Ab)use? Problems with Tradi-
tional Justice in Northern Uganda” from 2008. Allen argues that exaggerated claims about 
Mato Oput and other local accountability and reconciliation rituals risk implying that the gov-
ernment and rest of the country have nothing to do with the northern conflict, and that the 
people of Northern Uganda need their own special justice measures, because they are not 
ready for moderns ones:  
Exaggerated claims about Mato Oput and other local modes of allocating accountability have suggested 
that the Acholi and other groups of northern Uganda are in some way different. Of course, they have 
their own way of life, but like descent people everywhere else, they require a functioning state to make 
the best of their life, including conventional forms for legal protection from those who might oppress 
them. (…) The obsession of so many concerned about the suffering in northern Uganda with ‘traditional 
justice’ inadvertently reinforces a tendency to demonise the people of the region. (…) The campaign for 
regionally and ‘tribally’ specific traditional justice has done nothing to promote national reintegration.270 
 
In fact, the widely promoted Mato Oput ritual actually only occurred rarely, and was not as 
common as suggested. Negotiations over compensation typically took place in cases of murder 
within a community rather than after a local war or clan feud271 and during his research in 
Uganda in 2004, he did not find widespread enthusiasm for the ritual among the Acholi. Not 
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surprisingly, Madi, Lango and Teso informants were even more dismissive, as they have also 
suffered at the hands of the LRA, but did not understand why it was the Acholi customs that 
were promoted.272 This also point to the dilemma that traditional justice may often by imple-
mented arbitrarily and discriminatory, and although the inclusion of other rituals in the 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation is a positive development, Allen argues that 
“listing rituals as if they are codified practices is misleading”.273  
 
Revisiting traditional justice  
Allen nonetheless argues that codifying select rituals is not impossible. If there is external sup-
port for doing so and figures of authority are created to perform them, they can be formalized 
into a pseudo-traditional system. If certain rituals are effectively adapted and institutionalized 
in locally convincing ways, they may start shaping the understandings of their participants.274  
 
In post-genocide Rwanda, traditional justice mechanisms have been re-invented in the Gacaca 
courts. High-level perpetrators such as those who planned and ordered the genocide are still 
tried at a Court of First Instance, but other categories are tried at the Gacaca courts. A plead-
guilty procedure provides the offenders with reduced sentences, of which half is served in 
prison, while the other half is paid back as community service.275 While the Gacaca courts have 
been recognized as a pragmatic supplement to a shattered judicial system, as well as for estab-
lishing local ownership by including all survivors of the conflict in its processes including vic-
tims, witnesses and perpetrators276, the courts inability to provide sufficient reparations to the 
victims remain problematic277. Despite this criticism, the Gacaca courts show that it is feasible 
to create hybrid mechanisms that combine rituals with formal judicial features. 
 
The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation remains silent on the intention of incor-
porating the traditional justice mechanisms into the formal judicial system in Uganda, but arti-
cle 9 in the Annexure states that “for the proper functioning of the special division of the court (…) legisla-
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tion may provide for the recognition of traditional and community justice processes in proceedings”278. It conse-
quently remains unclear whether traditional justice mechanisms will supplement or replace 
conventional criminal justice.  
 
Incorporating traditional justice into the judicial institutions of the state could help bring le-
gitimacy into the rituals while at the same time strengthening state institutions. The traditional 
and religious leaders, who would gain the most political influence through such a system, are 
already promoting this agenda in Uganda.279 These leaders have already gained legitimacy 
through their interactions with the ICC and if their role as intermediaries between the victim 
population and the ICC280 could be translated into a national context within a hybrid court sys-
tem functioning as intermediaries of the state and the people of Northern Uganda, such a sys-
tem could potentially contribute to national reconciliation 
 
Restoring broken relationship 
It is nonetheless unclear if the promotion of traditional justice in Northern Uganda is intended 
to further national reconciliation. The Agreement of Accountability and Reconciliation and its 
Annexure appear to emphasize individual and community reconciliation, as the agreement re-
fers reconciliation as “the process of restoring broken relationships and re-establishing harmony”.281  
 
Barney Afako, an advocate of traditional justice and a technical assistant to the Amnesty 
Commission suggests tha “most Acholi have decided to promote reconciliation, rather than a retributive 
understanding of justice, to create conditions to end the war and reintegrate community”.282 Moreover, the 
call for the Amnesty Act and traditional justice have been based on a recognition that a mean-
ingful distinction between victims and perpetrators is not possible in Uganda, as most of the 
combatants are victims themselves having been forcibly recruited into the LRA, which gener-
ates the recognition that anyone could have been be subjected to the conditions that made 
them perpetrators. Most authors seem to agree on the importance of these measures in wel-
coming home former abductees. Even Amnesty International which has been sceptical about 
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the GoU’s intentions behind the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation suggests 
that “traditional justice can play an important part in facilitating truth telling and the reintegration of ab-
ducted persons, including children, back into the community.” However, they do also emphasize that 
such mechanisms should be a supplement and not a replacement of criminal justice proc-
esses.283  
 
It is questionable whether reconciliation is possible through traditional justice mechanisms. 
Despite its revival appears to have lost relevance for some people and areas in Northern 
Uganda. Practices might be widespread in some areas, while less common in others, just as 
some rituals might not have been performed in a long time because the conflict and poverty 
has made it impossible to gather all the components needed. As Latigo argues, the cultural 
identity of Acholi is not just shaped by traditional practices, but also by the Christian and Mus-
lim faith as well as by modernity, so even though parts of Acholi identity is expressed through 
traditional beliefs, values and practices, other dynamics must be considered as well. Also, the 
traditional practices might not be relevant for all people in Northern Uganda; this is especially 
the case for young people, who have grown up during a time of conflict having limited oppor-
tunities to participate in such practices, just as Christian communities reject traditional prac-
tices.284 Also, most rituals are currently only being performed where donor funds are avail-
able285.  
 
Even though the traditional justice practice provides for some degree of accountability through 
payment of compensation to the victim or its family, and the truth telling process might pro-
vide the a platform for the victims to convey their story, reconciliation at the individual level is 
a deeply personal process, which may differ from one person to the other and is as such not 
guaranteed through these rituals. Also, not every victim is willing to forgive and forget, an ar-
gument put forth by Brudholm, who in his book “Resentment’s Virtue” from 2008 argues that 
some people having been the victims of mass atrocities resist forgiving. This ‘unforgiveness’, 
he argues, is not only understandable but also has a morale component, which often is forgot-
ten by advocates in favor of reconciliation, healing and forgiveness: “the preservation of resentment 
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or the refusal to forgive may itself reflect a moral protest and ambition that might be as permissible, admirable, 
or humane as the willingness to forgive”. 286 Additionally, as long as the practices are conducted out-
side the state institutions it is unlikely to contribute to national reconciliation.  
 
6.4 Truth telling and reparations 
In addition to the traditional justice mechanisms provided for in the Agreement on Account-
ability and Reconciliation, the agreement also provides for the establishment of truth telling 
and reparations as part of the alternative justice framework.  
 
Truth telling 
In article 2 of the agreement both parties support the establishment of “a comprehensive, independ-
ent and impartial analysis of the history and manifestations of the conflict, especially the human rights violations 
and crimes committed during the course of the conflict in an essential ingredient to for attaining reconciliation at 
all levels”287. To foster reconciliation it is consequently agreed in article 4 of the agreement’s an-
nexure to establish a body to analyse the history of the conflict, inquiry into its manifestations 
including human rights abuses committed during its course, hold public hearings, protect wit-
nesses, promote truth telling and other forms of memorials, gather information about the dis-
appeared and make recommendations for the appropriate modalities for implementing a re-
gime of reparations. Its findings shall be disclosed in a public document.288  
 
The establishment of a truth commission, which is likely to be the most important body for 
reconciliation in the agreements, has the potential of contributing to national reconciliation by 
creating societal consensus of the past through the disclosure of all events during the conflict’s 
course; hereby contributing to the process of achieving positive peace. Unfortunately, the 
mandate of the truth telling body is imprecise and most likely reflects a reluctant compromise 
agreed by both sides of the conflict, neither of whom are interested in a genuine truth and rec-
onciliation process that might reveal the history of the atrocities and damaged inflicted by 
them on the people of Northern Uganda throughout the conflict.  
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Moreover, as crimes increasingly have been committed outside Uganda, firstly in Southern Su-
dan and more recently in the DRC, the Central African Republic and Chad, it is in this project 
argued that it is necessary to establish a regional dimension to the work of the truth commis-
sion. This could include establishing linkages to the South Sudan Peace Commission, estab-
lished in Sudan in 2005 as part of the CPA, granting the Ugandan truth commission the op-
portunity to make recommendations to both the GoU and the GoS.289 
 
To provide full disclosure of the conflict and promote national reconciliation through a truth 
commission, full participation from all sides of the conflict would need to be ensured, includ-
ing victims, perpetrators and witnesses and not least the participation of government soldiers. 
Providing the perpetrators with an incentive to participate in such a process might however be 
difficult. In South Africa, by way of illustration, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
established with a mandate to provide a public record of human rights abuses committed in 
1960-1994 during the apartheid regime. Moreover, it was mandated to grant amnesties, and to 
provide recommendations to the government about reparations.290 Rather than providing 
blanket amnesties as done in Latin America, the amnesties in South Africa were provided on 
an individual basis; just as the perpetrators received amnesty in exchange for full details of their 
crimes giving them a powerful incentive to come forward and assist the commission’s work.291  
 
Unfortunately, no such ideas have been reflected in the agreements leaving the commission 
with a weak mandate to mp past atrocities. Instead, the framework resembles the not very suc-
cessful predecessor, the Ugandan Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights es-
tablished in 1986 to examine the atrocities committed under the governments of Obote and 
Amin from 1962-1986. The previous commission commenced its work with public hearings 
accompanied by extensive television, radio, and newspaper coverage. However despite hopes 
for a process of consensus building and closure among the Ugandans and foreign observer, the 
Commission’s ineffectiveness over time resulted in increased lack of confidence and/or lost in-
terest among the Ugandans and, thereby, lost whatever possible accountability and reconcilia-
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tion effect it could have had. The report of the Commission of Inquiry was only completed in 
end-1994 and copies remained stored in warehouses.292  
 
It is crucial that new efforts do not duplicate this process, which would be unfortunate for the 
reconciliation process in Uganda.  
 
Reparations  
The final part of the alternative justice framework of the Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation regulates reparations, which “may include a range of measures such as: rehabilitation; 
restitution; compensation; guarantees of non-recurrence and other symbolic measures such as apologies, memorials 
and commemorations (…)293. However, if the agreements are unclear on the mandate of the truth 
commission, they are even less clear with regard to the reparations scheme for which it is only 
stated that the GoU “shall establish the necessary arrangements”.294 
 
Although the Agreement of Accountability and Reconciliation provides for the body of inquiry 
to make recommendations on the “most appropriate modalities for implementing a regime of repara-
tions”295, there are no provisions for building a reparations program. At the time of writing the 
JLOS’ Transitional Justice Working Group did not have a separate sub-committee on repara-
tions, which may indicate that GoU prioritizes prosecutions over reparations: While funds are 
being allocated to the recruitment of judges, there is no reparation scheme in place.296  
 
If Uganda’s transitional justice efforts are to pay off, it is key to include all survivors of the 
conflict, not just the perpetrators. In Sierra Leona, by way of example, the funds available for 
prosecutions in the Special Court of Sierra Leona are a hundred times bigger than the funds 
available for the reparations schemes. A total of $330 million has been spent on prosecuting 
just 9 perpetrators, while the funds for reparations only amounts to 1 % hereof.297 With a tran-
sitional justice approach emphasizing the importance of focusing on all survivors of a conflict, 
this hardly contributes to a genuine end to impunity. Recalling Teitel’s argument, reparations 
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constitute a recognition of the rights of the individual, which is fundamental to the liberal state 
reflecting that a comprehensive reparations scheme might be one of the most important tools 
with potential to rebuild trust in the state institutions and the GoU. The importance of repara-
tions is also expressed by the Ugandan population. When asked what should be done for the 
victims, 51.8 % of the respondents in a survey, conducted by Pham et al. in 2007, answered 
that they should be provided with financial compensation, while only 1.7 % demanded justice. 
It is, however, worth bearing in mind that only 29 % of the respondents associated “justice” 
with conventional criminal justice such as trials298 and instead pointed to the importance of 
reparations in the eyes the victims. 
 
Dolan et al., project advisors to the Refugee Law Project, argue that the reason for this might 
be explained by the Ugandan language, where there are no direct translations for the words 
“crimes” or “punishment”, but where the words as “wrongs” and “righting a wrong” are more 
easily translated. In this respect, reparations figure large when it comes to righting a wrong.299  
 
It is, however, also plausible that reparations are important to the people, because they consti-
tuted part of a combined justice approach including truth telling, reparations and accountability 
and reconciliation measures in local justice practices, and not because the people of Uganda 
cannot comprehend punitive responses. Indeed, in a report published by the Refugee Law Pro-
ject in July 2009, a month after Dolan et al.’s article, it is argued that punitive and retributive 
elements have constituted a bigger part of traditional justice measure than what is acknowl-
edged in research so far.  The punitive aspect has often been part of initial community re-
sponses to crimes, which then was followed by the other traditional justice elements: truth tell-
ing and reparations300. This does not necessary reflect a contradiction in the research of the 
Refugee Law Project, but perhaps just a recent recognition that a total disregard of retributive 
elements in local justice practices would be misleading.  
 
In this respect, even though 58 % indicated that reparations should be provided for the vic-
tims, this does not necessarily indicate that this should happen at the expense of other meas-
ures, but is more likely to reflect that they are considered part of a broader framework, which 
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is why it might be worth considering dealing with the reparations and truth telling in an inte-
grated manner. The truth commissions in Chile and Argentina sat precedence for such 
schemes; the National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation in Chile 1990-1991 for in-
stance provided cash payments, educational and medical benefits to the families of the disap-
peared and killed, while the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons in Argen-
tina in 1983-1984 provided cash payments to the families of the disappeared and killed as well 
as those imprisoned for political reasons or forced into exile.301 Likewise, as suggested by the 
ICG, reparations should be the outcome of a thorough investigation by a genuine truth and 
reconciliation commission, whose mandate, composition and method of operation would need 
to be established through the consultation of various stakeholders to ensure compliance with 
the needs of the people and ensure local ownership.302 Moreover, for the reparation scheme to 
reflect the grievances of the people it is intended for, they too need to be engaged in the plan-
ning and implementation of the program.303  
 
As argued by the ICG, the GoU seems preoccupied with the costs of such a program, and 
while victims often cite public acknowledgement of the wrongdoings as the most important 
element of a reparations scheme, this is often overshadowed by debates about the costs of it.304 
A common defence of allocating funds to retributive justice rather reparations, is that repara-
tions are complicated and in some instances involve recurrent expenditures such as pensions, 
which makes it more difficult to raise funds, as donors frequently prefer once-off donations.305 
However, reparations should not be framed as a single handout, but should be framed as a 
proper program conveying “the sense that reparations are owed to the victims as bearers of rights”306.   
 
6.5 Summary 
Having analysed and discussed the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, it appears 
as if the GoU is prioritizing conventional criminal justice at the expense of the alternative jus-
tice mechanisms outlined in the agreements. While including conventional means of criminal 
justice in the peace process is crucial in ending a long history of impunity in Uganda, as it by 
                                               
301 Hayner 2001:292-293;314-317 
302 ICG 2008:18 
303 AI 2008:22 
304 ICG 2008:18 
305 Dolan et al. 2009:1 
306 ICG 2008:18 
  71 
establishing accountability for the perpetrators can provide a sense of justice to the victims, as 
well as help rebuild trust in the state institutions by enhancing the rule of law, it is crucial that 
is not just an attempt by Museveni to get around the ICC indictments or avoid prosecuting 
government forces as well, which would only add to de-legitimizing the state legitimacy.  
 
Moreover, as part of an alternative justice framework the agreements include traditional justice, 
truth telling and reparations, which have great potential of contributing to national reconcilia-
tion through the recognition of all survivors of the conflict, especially the victims. However, it 
is unclear whether the GoU genuinely backs these initiatives. While traditional justice is identi-
fied as a key contributor to reconciliation in the agreements, this may only take place at the in-
dividual level, just as the possibility of contributing to national reconciliation through the es-
tablishment of hybrid courts is lost. Additionally, the two main forums for the victims to be 
recognized; the truth telling body is provided with a weak mandate just as a reparation scheme 
is still pending.  
 
Instead of continuously juxtaposing local demands and international obligations, it is perhaps 
time to attempt to reconcile the two systems to “envision a more synthesized and comprehensive ap-
proach to peace and war”307, hereby taking important steps towards enhancing the prospects for 
national reconciliation and positive peace. 
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7. The Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions  
This chapter constitutes the third part of this project’s analysis, which focuses on the transi-
tional justice mechanisms within the framework of the Agreement on Comprehensive Solu-
tions of 2 May 2007 and the Implementation Protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive 
Solutions of 22 February 2008. This includes an analysis of the GoU efforts to address the root 
causes of the conflict through socio-economic and political reform as well as its efforts to meet 
the needs of the large number of returning IDPs.  
 
7.1 Approaching an agreement  
Transitional justice has conventionally focused on rectificatory mechanisms, such as the ones 
discussed in the two previous chapters: trials, reparations, and truth commissions. Scholars and 
politicians have increasingly started to recognize the importance of including more forward-
looking mechanisms, which aim at addressing the structural injustices in the society such as 
economic and/or political inequality, which is also reflected in the Agreement to Comprehen-
sive Solutions.  
 
Comprehensive solutions to the conflict were addressed at agenda item 1 of the Juba Peace 
Talks, including topics as economic recovery of Northern Uganda and increased representa-
tion of the people in Northern Uganda in politics and state institutions. During the negotia-
tions, LRA demanded 35 % representation of people from Northern and Eastern Uganda in 
military, governmental and ambassadorial posts. Mr. Machar, the mediator of the Juba Peace 
Talks, suggested that recruitment into the army forces and security services should reflect na-
tional numbers, just as the GoU insisted that equal political representation in the state institu-
tions should be dealt with in its Equal Opportunities Commission.308 
 
The negotiations during the Juba Peace Talks resulted in two agreements: the Agreement on 
Comprehensive Solutions of 2 May 2007 providing the overall framework, and the Implemen-
tation Protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions of 22 February 2008. Overall, 
the two agreements are intended to address the claims of marginalization and disempowerment 
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of the people in Northern Uganda, and they accordingly include provisions on economic de-
velopment in the North; return and resettlement of IDPs; and equal participation in the state 
institutions and the military, each of which will be analysed in the following.  
 
7.2 Economic and social recovery of the North  
In the preamble to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions the parties recognize “the re-
gional disparities and imbalances in terms of socio-economic development of the country as a result of the con-
flict”309 for which they in article 10 recognize “the vital need for adopting an overarching framework for 
delivering sound and comprehensive programmes for the recovery of conflict-affected areas of north and north-east 
Uganda”.310 These agreements provide for the development, adoption and quick implementa-
tion of the Northern Ugandan Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda 
(PRDP)311, which is the primary (and only) tool that has been adopted by the GoU to address 
the socio-economic inequalities of Northern Uganda. It is, and as argued by Mani, crucial to 
address the underlying causes of the conflict, which is why the PRDP is included in this con-
text to analyse its potential to address the socio-economic inequalities of Northern Uganda.  
 
The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda  
The PRDP 2007-2010 was adopted in September 2007 with the overall goal being “stabilization 
in order to regain and consolidate peace and lay foundation for recovery and development in Northern 
Uganda”.312  
 
To achieve this goal the PRDP sets out four strategic objectives:  
1. Consolidation of State Authority, including cessation of armed hostilities; establishment of 
law and order and enhancement of protection, enhancing the functionality of judicial 
and legal services; and strengthening of local government presence and effectiveness, 
2. Rebuilding and Empowering of Communities, including improving conditions and quality of 
life of the displaced persons; return and reintegration of displaced populations; and ini-
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tiating community rehabilitation and recovery activities in all communities; provision of 
services and protection of vulnerable groups, 
3. Revitalization of the Economy, re-activating the productive sectors focusing on agriculture; 
rehabilitation of critical infrastructure; strengthening Land Use and Urban Planning 
and Management, industrialization; and reinforcing mechanisms for management of 
environment and natural resources,    
4. Peace Building and Reconciliation, including increased access to information and the media; 
expanded access to trauma counselling services; and reinforcement of local conflict 
resolution.313 
 
The PRDP contributes to the overall objective of the national Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP) adopted by the GoU in 2004314. The objective of the PEAP is to transform Uganda 
into a middle-income country by 2017315. 
 
Funding of the PRDP  
The launch of the PRDP was accompanied by some confusion and uncertainty, which resulted 
in a delay of the implementation phase until July 2008. This can partly be explained by the fact 
that no clear funding mechanism was in place just prior to the finalisation of the plan making it 
unclear whether the PRDP would work in parallel to the PEAP or be a coordinating frame-
work. Additionally, there was disputes over the $606m budget (see table 7.1) for recovery in 
Northern Uganda, which was considered a massive underestimate as it was unclear whether 
this provided the total costs for recovery in Northern Uganda.316 Before committing funds to 
the PRDP, donors one the one hand demanded an indication of the GoU’s financial commit-
ment to the PRDP, while the GoU on the other hand wanted to know how much to expect 
from the donors before deciding on its own contributions. Lack of clarity on the inter-linkage 
between various funding mechanisms, including the UN’s Consolidated Appeals Process 
(CAP)317 and the PRDP caused further confusion and delays.318 
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Table 7.1 PRDP Budget319  
Strategic objectives Budget UGX Budget USD % Total Budget 
Consolidation of state authority 
Rebuilding and empowering communities 
Revitalization of the economy 
Peace building and reconciliation  
Program management 
259,805,128,720 
517,489,619,951 
253,112,895,260 
29,528,991,184 
31,798,099,053 
144,336,182 
287,494,233 
140,618,275 
16,404,995 
17,665,611 
23.8 
47.4 
23.2 
2.7 
2.9 
Total 1,091,734,169 606,519,297 100 
 
The GoU has since tried to clarify these issues emphasizing that it is a coordinating framework 
for all programs and projects in Northern Uganda, just as the budget of the PRDP is an addi-
tion to the budgetary support already provided by the donors and that funds for projects, 
which are aligned to the PRDP but not running through the government budget will be in-
cluded in the financing, hereby allowing off-budget donors and funding through the CAP.320 
 
It soon became clear however that the GoU’s financial commitment would be considerable 
less than suggested by its initial projections321. While the GoU’s initially had planned donor 
funds should only account for 14 % of the total PRDP budget, its current commitment of 
$60.6m still amounts to less than 30 % of the initially commitment to the first fiscal year. 322 
 
At the district level key government officials have stressed that lack of information about the 
funding and implementation mechanisms jeopardizes their ability to incorporate the PRDP 
into their district development plans323; especially government officials are uncertain whether 
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the PRDP would result in extra funding flowing to the district budget.324 Confusion about the 
PRDP at sub-county level is even worse.325  
 
The PRDP - A political tool?  
While the PRDP has potential as a promising framework for peace building and reconstruc-
tion, it may be criticized for being geared towards satisfying the GoU’s political agenda rather 
than fostering peace and reconciliation.  
 
The ICG criticises the GoU for using the PRDP to create a patronage system in Northern 
Uganda and thereby “buying” political support in a region where its opposition is biggest326. 
ICG further argues the primary beneficiaries of the PRDP are government connected contrac-
tors, the political elite and employees of government’s agencies.327 These concerns have been 
exacerbated by the GoU failure to explain why specific projects have been chosen as pilot pro-
jects and how these align with the  larger strategic implementation plan of the PRDP, just as 
the GoU has failed to account for the inclusion of two additionally priority areas added to the 
PRDP328. Also, the PRDP geographically covers 40 districts, almost half of the country, rather 
than focusing on the initial 18 LRA affected districts, which questions how adequate it is in 
addressing the specific needs and grievances of the people of Northern Uganda 329 
 
Peace and reconciliation 
While facing insufficient lack of funding and potential corruption scandals, the PRDP has, fur-
thermore, been criticized for only allocating 2.7 % of the budget to strategic objective 4: peace 
building and reconciliation. This is less than what is budgeted to program management330, 
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which leaves doubts as to the GoU’s actual commitment to the strategic objective that the 
Refugee Law project hails as the most important cornerstone in the recovery process.331 
Norad, moreover, argues that the PRDP appears preoccupied with the technical aspect of re-
building central and local government institutions, improving service delivery and revitalizing 
the economy, presumably to improve the popularity of the government, and not so much with 
providing comprehensive political solutions to peace building and national reconciliation, 
which probably are better pursued by the implementation of Agreement on Comprehensive 
Solutions332.  
 
However, it can be argued that the total budget of the PRDP is allocated to peace building. 
Firstly, the PRDP is the overarching framework as provided for in the Agreement on Com-
prehensive Solutions to deal with the economic and social development of Northern Uganda 
and should as not be regarded as a separate tool. Also, strategic objective 4 should not be seen 
as the only effort to bring about peace in the region. Other objectives of the PRDP have po-
tential of contributing to achieving peace, such as strategic objective 1, which foresees invest-
ments that further cessation of armed hostilities and the rule of law. Strategic objective 2 and 3, 
moreover, enable the safe return of IDPs, just as they seek to revitalize the economy in North-
ern Uganda to diminish the gap between Northern and Southern Uganda; all crucial steps in 
achieving national reconciliation and peace.  
 
That being said, all will depend on the GoU’s ability to raise funds for the PRDP. 
 
7. 3 Return and resettlement of internally displaced persons  
Another focus of the Agreement on Comprehensive Solution is the return and resettlement of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). In article 9, the parties to the conflict “commit themselves to 
ending the conflict and thereby ensuring the conditions for the voluntary, dignified and secure return of all IDPs 
in accordance with the principles adopted in the IDP Policy”.333 For this purpose, the GoU “shall develop 
and implement a strategy for assisting the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs)”.334 
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The inclusion of IDPs in the Agreement of Comprehensive Solutions is important, as the 
GoU needs to focus on all survivors of the conflict, not just a small number of perpetrators 
and the direct victims. As argued by Daly & Sarkin in 2007, to achieve national reconciliation 
the GoU must recognize and respond to the needs of the huge number of displaced people, 
whose lives invariably are traumatized by the conflict, even if they are not directly part of the 
conflict.335  
 
Although the provisions dealing with the IDPs in the agreement and its implementation proto-
col do not include specifics on how to secure the safe return and resettlement of IDPs it refers 
to the principles in the National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons according to which 
this should happen. The National Policy for IDPs was adopted in August 2004336 and draws on 
the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998.337 In July 2006, the Representa-
tive of the UN’s Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Wal-
ter Kälin stated that:  
Although it is one of the countries worst-affected by internal displacement, Uganda is also one of the 
first countries in the world to have adopted a national policy aimed at upholding the rights of its inter-
nally displaced population. (…) The policy (…) provides a sound example for other countries to follow 
in adapting these international standards on internal displacement to a national context. Indeed, I often 
cite Uganda’s policy as one of the best.338   
 
This was an opening statement for a workshop that sought a more effective implementation of 
the National IDP Policy.339 The implementation of the National IDP Policy has not been suc-
cessful. Rushed decentralisation reforms did not provide the local governments with sufficient 
resources to implement the policy, just as there was lack of communication between national 
and local authorities, lack of coordination among the large number of humanitarian actors in 
the region, and little consultation with the IDPs.340  
 
The main implementing framework of the National IDP Policy is the PRDP of which strategic 
objective 2: Rebuilding and Empowering of Communities is concerned with the IDP resettle-
ment programs. As of July 2009, the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Ministers Office, Pius 
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Bigirimana, said that there is still a big funding gap to implement the projects under the objec-
tive341. The GoU nevertheless intends to have the remaining 500,000 people still in camps re-
turned to their homes by December 2009342.  
 
From emergency to recovery  
The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities from 2006 that brought relative stability to North-
ern Uganda allowed hundreds of thousands of IDPs to leave their camps. Against the 1.8 mil-
lion IDPs at the height of the conflict in the mid-1990s, the number has continuously de-
creased since and was in August 2009 estimated to be 622,000343. Huge efforts now have to be 
made to ensure durable solutions for the many returning people. Uganda’s Camp Phase Out 
Guidelines of 2008 provides for three durable solutions for IDPs: 1) Voluntary return; 2) Set-
tlement in former camp; and 3) Relocation to another part of the country.344 Some of the IDPs 
in camps or transit areas might prefer to relocate to communities or settle in the camp areas, 
where basic services such as schools and medical clinics are available rather than returning to 
their home land.345  
 
While on paper the GoU upholds the right of IDPs to resettle in camps, in practice it appears 
to be pushing for return as the only durable solution. Much of the camp land is privately 
owned, and the GoU seems to consider the rights of the landowners to reclaim their land 
higher than the IDPs right of settlement in the camp areas.346 The Camp Phase Out Guidelines 
states that resettling IDPs can “formalize their stay through the due process of law”347; in reality this 
means that the landowners and the IDPs are left to negotiate an arrangement on a case-by-case 
basis leaving the IDPs disadvantaged, as the GoU has effectively ruled out compensation for 
landowners.348 
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While people leave the camps, the most vulnerable: widows, orphans, elderly people, people 
with disabilities or the sick remain or are left behind349. The GoU tries to push people out of 
the camps, even when it has not provided the sufficient health and education services and the 
means restoration of basic livelihoods350. Furthermore, the Refugee Law Project’s research in-
dicates that the IDPs that self-settle in rural and urban areas are currently excluded from assis-
tance351.  
 
Much debate has taken place about when displacement ends352 and how the transition from 
humanitarian emergency relief to recovery and development should take place353, but in order 
for the GoU to meet the needs of all survivors of the conflict, it is crucial to recognise and re-
spond to the need of IDPs whose lives have been traumatized by the conflict, even if they 
have not directly been part of the conflict. As suggested by Daly & Sarkin this is essential for 
national reconciliation354. Hence, in order to meet these challenges it is important that IDPs are 
supported in return or resettling areas, dispute over landownership must be dealt with, just as 
knowledge about the complex return patterns need to be scrutinized. As Brookings Institute 
suggests displacement does not end until the “IDPs no longer have needs specifically related to their 
displacement. This does not mean that they may not continue to have need for protection and assistance, but 
their needs would be no different from other similarly situated citizens”.355 
 
7.4 Participation in national politics and institutions  
In addition to the provisions addressing socio-economic inequalities in Northern Uganda the 
Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions and its Implementation Protocol also include provi-
sions that seek to address the unequal representation and participation of people from North-
ern Uganda in national politics and state institutions.  
 
The lack of specifics in these provisions, however, soon becomes apparent. The parties reaf-
firm their commitment to the principles in the Constitution, in which it is stated that the “com-
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position of the Government shall be broadly representative of the national character, gender and social diversity 
of the county”356, just as the parties “affirm the principle of proportional representation of all regions in the 
armed forces and other security agencies as a guarantee for sustainable stability in the country”357. The 
Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions however fails to provide specific details on how this 
should be implemented.  
 
The main body to be responsible for addressing the regional and ethnic imbalances is the 
Equal Opportunities Commission, which has been planned for in the 1995 Constitution, but is 
yet to be established358. The GoU commit to make it operational during the implementation of 
the FPA359, but as the FPA is not enacted because of Kony’s failure to sign it, it may raise con-
cerns that the commission is never established. This concern is also expressed by the ICG, 
who argues that: “realistically, the Juba talks were never intended to radically change Uganda’s political 
system and give opposition parties by negotiation what they could not obtain through elections”.360  
 
Political representation 
Disproportionate representation in state institutions is obvious. 44 % of all top public ap-
pointments are held by Western Ugandans, just as Western Ugandans constitute 74 % of the 
army’s top positions. All resource heavy ministerial positions are also held by Western Ugan-
dans. Together with their permanent secretaries from the region, they control 71 % of the na-
tional budget. In comparison ministers from the North control just 4 % of the national budget. 
These numbers are problematic when taking into consideration that the region amounts to 
only 26 % of the total population in Uganda.361  
 
When Museveni seized power in the 1986, he introduced a one-party system, which only al-
lowed the operation of the NRM (National Resistance Movement). This system remained in 
place for two decades, until Ugandan voters in 2005 approved constitutional amendments that 
lifted the ban on political parties introducing the potential for a multi-party system. The consti-
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tutional amendment, moreover, removed the prohibition on sitting presidents running for a 
third term, which allowed the re-election of Museveni in 2006, which he won with 59 % of the 
vote over his leading opponent, Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change. Despite 
these changes towards a more democratic state, valid concerns remain regarding the ability of 
opposition parties to compete with the NRM. Opposition parties have protested restrictive 
party registration requirements and the dominant status of the NRM. Other controversial is-
sues include the use of governmental resources to support their own candidates, and the 
GoU’s use of illegal paramilitary groups to intimidate voters and political opponents.362 The 
ICG argues accordingly:  
(…) no political trends suggest governance is improving or that there are, or are likely soon to be, coun-
tervailing powers to the NRM government and NRM-dominated parliament that can help correct the 
situation. (…) Uganda is evolving towards perpetuation of de-facto single party politics, dominated by 
the group that took power in 1986 and enjoys almost complete impunity for abuses.363 
 
When established, it is essential that the Equal Opportunities Commission progressively ad-
dresses these regional inequalities in the representation in public offices, just as it will need to 
ensure fair and equal competition during the upcoming presidential elections in 2011 to build 
trust back into the institutions.  
 
Vetting 
Finally, attention must be paid to the lack of vetting procedures in Uganda. Under framework 
of institutional reforms within transitional justice, vetting is defined as a “formal process for the 
identification and removal of individuals responsible for abuses from public office”. Vetting is considered an 
integral part of the process of restoring trust in state institutions in an attempt to ensure that 
the structures that facilitated human rights abuses in the past no longer exist.364 This also in-
cludes the security sector, which often is most implicated in human rights abuse365, which in 
Uganda is the case with the UPDF and LDU atrocities committed against civilians. 
 
“Administrative impunity” flourishes in Uganda as no alleged perpetrators of human rights 
abuses in the UPDF or LDU have been removed from their positions or been charged for 
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their crimes committed. The Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions provides for LRA ex-
combatants to “be integrated into the national armed forces and other security agencies”366. This is highly 
problematic as such measures contribute to legitimizing the violence against the civilians and 
provide de facto impunity, which significantly decreases the Northern Ugandans trust in the 
state institutions. As argued by OHCHR in its operational framework on vetting from 2006, 
victims of abuses are unlikely to trust and rely on public institutions that keep or hire individu-
als that have been part of the planning or execution of human rights abuses, which would fun-
damentally compromise the institution’s capacity to deliver its mandate. Vetting is therefore 
crucial as it aims “at excluding from public service persons with serious integrity deficits in order to (re-
)establish civic trust and (re-)legitimize public institutions”.367 It is, however, recognised that attempts to 
integrate LRA ex-combatants into the army may be an attempt to establish peace by absorbing 
military opponents to avoid the repetition of the former UNLA soldiers’ inability to reintegrate 
their homesteads in 1986.  
 
The lack of vetting/administrative justice procedures in Uganda paired with corruption368 and a 
judicial system which independence cannot be guaranteed; prolonged pre-trial detention, in-
adequate resources, the security forces’ refusal to respect civilian courts and the military’s re-
peatedly interference with court processes, as well poor judicial administration369 question the 
fair exercise of justice.  
 
The GoU has so far failed to raise funds to address the socio-economic inequalities of North-
ern Uganda through the PRDP framework, and if it also fails to address the political inequali-
ties, the future looks bleak. Addressing two of the main root causes to the conflict is crucial for 
Uganda to move towards lasting peace. Failing to meet the grievances of the people in North-
ern Uganda is likely to, at the best, result in the continued presence of negative peace under-
stood as the absence of violence, or worse and more likely, it will result in recurrent conflict 
with the LRA being the tool through which the people of Northern Uganda express their 
grievances. 
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369 Freedom House 2009 
 84 
7.5 Summary 
At first glance the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions of 2007, it appears a promising 
tool to address the main root causes of the conflict: socio-economic inequality and political 
disempowerment. When subject to thorough analysis, it however becomes clear that these ini-
tiatives are in vain if not backed by genuine political will and the necessary funding. The PRDP 
is a positive step towards addressing the marginalization of Northern Uganda from the rest of 
the country, which is necessary if Northern Uganda is to achieve long-term reconciliation. 
Lack of funding, confusion about its implementation, and risks of corruption, however, se-
verely jeopardizes this opportunity. Lack of support to the many IDPs that are currently re-
turning or resettling, lack of basic livelihood support, as well as disputes over land additionally 
illustrate the GoU failure to meet the needs of its people. Equal participation in politics and 
state institutions is necessary to meet the grievances of the people in Northern Uganda; but all 
the initiatives to address this remain pending, until the Equal Opportunities Commission is es-
tablished, just as nothing indicate a development towards Uganda turning a multi party-system 
with fair and equal competition. Finally, de facto administrative impunity caused by the ab-
sence of adequate vetting mechanisms and a partial judicial system significantly compromise 
the population’s trust in state institutions.  If the GoU does not succeed in addressing the root 
causes of the conflict, it is very unlikely that Uganda will move from a situation of relative sta-
bility towards lasting peace. Violence might to some degree be absent currently, but is unlikely 
to continue if these challenges are not met leaving LRA as a potential tool through which the 
people will express their grievances.   
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8. Conclusion: Beyond Juba – Achieving peace?  
Northern Uganda has been ravaged by violent conflict between the Government of Uganda 
(GoU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) for more than 20 years. The consequences of 
the conflict have been far-reaching and include destabilisation of the region, the displacement 
of up to 1.8 million people, the killing and mutilation of tens of thousands of civilians, and the 
abduction of even more civilians, mainly children, for recruitment in the LRA forces. Many 
years of failing attempts to put and end to the conflict and end the miseries of the Ugandan 
population have finally paid off in recent years with a series of peace building initiatives that 
have brought relative stability to the region.  
  
Peace and conflict resolution scholars often argue that long-term reconciliation and lasting 
peace are best achieved through the pursuit of justice. This project has therefore examined to 
what extent the pursuit of justice has been addressed as a par of the GoU’s peace building ef-
forts. While transitional justice is often addressed in post-conflict contexts, Uganda is an inter-
esting example of how transitional justice can be addressed in an ongoing conflict. The project 
scrutinizes the dilemmas of pursuing justice in the context of ongoing conflict by applying a 
comprehensive theoretical framework of transitional justice situated within a framework of 
peace and conflict resolution theory. The analytical focus of the project is 1) the GoU’s referral 
of the situation in Northern Uganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2003 and the 
subsequent arrest warrants; 2) the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation of 29 June 
2007; and 3) the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions of 2 May 2007 signed during the 
Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008). 
 
Overall, the GoU’s comprehensive transitional justice strategy, which includes international 
and national criminal justice, traditional justice, and truth telling, reparations, as well as provi-
sions on political and economic reforms, is a promising framework which has the potential of 
contributing to national reconciliation and lasting peace. The transitional justice processes as 
initiated by the GoU in its efforts to restore peace however face severe obstacles, as a range of 
factors risk compromise the prospects for peace.  
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Firstly, it is argued that the failure of the ICC and the national judicial system to prosecute the 
alleged perpetrators from both parties to the conflict risk undermining the legitimacy of the 
peace building process. At the international level, the referral of the situation in Northern 
Uganda to the ICC in 2003 could have indicated a genuine intention of President Museveni to 
end the legacy of impunity in Uganda. This notion was, however, soon diluted when he subse-
quently attempted to withdraw the case. While the ICC has the potential to conduct impartial 
and independent prosecutions and, thereby, enhancing its legitimacy and respect for the rule of 
law, the failure to effectuate the arrest warrants and to address the crimes committed by the 
Uganda’s Peoples Democratic Force (UPDF) and the Local Defense Units (LDU) highly 
compromises its legitimacy, and the ICC comes across as partial and politicized. While the ICC 
arrest warrants have prevented the LRA from signing the Final Peace Agreement of the Juba 
Peace Talks – and as such has faced the core dilemma of pursuing peace or justice - it is argued 
that the warrants must not be withdrawn, as they send an important signal to the world and 
not least to the people of Uganda that the international society will not accept impunity for 
atrocities that breach international humanitarian law.  
 
As for prosecutions at the national level, the GoU has provided for a set of criminal justice 
mechanisms, which if implemented correctly can put an end to many years of impunity in 
Uganda. The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation of 2007 provides for the estab-
lishment of a special division of the High Court to prosecute individuals, who have breached 
international humanitarian law, which potentially can facilitate the re/building of civic trust in 
the GoU and its institutions by providing accountability for the perpetrators and provide the 
victims with a sense of justice, hereby enhancing the rule of law. Nothing, however, indicates 
that the GoU intend to end impunity for crimes committed by the senior military leaders of 
the UPDF, and attempts to strengthen the national judicial system mainly seem an attempt to 
prove that Uganda is both willing and capable of prosecuting the LRA leaders with the objec-
tive to get around the ICC indictments. If this is case, the GoU would come across as partial 
and politicized as the ICC, and hereby risk undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
of Northern Uganda, who already feel betrayed by the lack of protection. While efforts to 
build capacity in the national judicial system is hailed as a positive development, it is stressed 
that the ICC must maintain its arrest warrants to ensure that justice will take place. 
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Secondly, it is stressed that the GoU has failed to support and legitimise the traditional justice 
mechanisms. Capacity building of the national judicial system is prioritized at the expense of 
the alternative justice mechanisms, which risks jeopardizing the potential for achieving national 
reconciliation. Traditional justice mechanisms can provide an appropriate mechanism to rein-
tegrate former LRA-abductees, who have also been victimized by the conflict and may through 
rituals contribute to individual or community based reconciliation. These mechanisms have, 
however, lost relevance to many, especially the youth, which may impair the chances of achiev-
ing the purpose of reconciliation. The traditional justice mechanisms can potentially be rein-
vented and integrated into the state institutions in the form of hybrid tribunals in which tradi-
tional leaders could be reinstalled as intermediaries between the state and the people of North-
ern Uganda. From a judicial perspective, it should be noted that such mechanisms cannot re-
place prosecutions for the most serious human rights violations and war crimes, as they are 
implemented in an arbitrary manner. 
 
Thirdly, it is argued as being highly problematic that the GoU has failed to recognise the suf-
fering of the victims through truth telling mechanisms with a clear mandate to provide repara-
tions. The Body of Inquiry (the Truth Commission) is established to provide a historical analy-
sis of the conflict through truth telling by all survivors of the conflict. The Body of Inquiry 
has, however, been granted a very weak mandate, just as the reparation scheme to compensate 
the victims remains pending. 
 
Fourthly, the GoU’s attempts to address the main root causes of the conflict, namely the 
socio-economic marginalization and political disempowerment of Northern Uganda are se-
verely questioned. While the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions at first glance appears as 
a promising tool to address the structural inequalities that have marginalized Northern Uganda 
and as such is one of the underlying causes of the conflict, it becomes apparent after closer 
scrutiny that the lack of genuine political will and insufficient financial resources may strongly 
impair Uganda’s prospect of moving towards a positive peace. The PRDP is a positive step 
towards reintegrating Northern Uganda with the rest of the country, but limited funding, con-
fusion about its implementation, and risks of corruption severely jeopardize its successful im-
plementation. This furthermore includes addressing the needs of the many IDPs, who are cur-
rently returning or resettling. The failure to establish the Equal Opportunities Commission, 
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further suggests that the GoU has never been truly interested in ensuring equal political par-
ticipation, just as there are no indications that Uganda is turning into a multi party-system with 
fair and equal elections. It is furthermore argued that the failure to pursue institutional reform 
and vet military staff risks undermining civic trust in public institutions and thereby de-
legitimizing the GoU.  
 
On paper, the transitional justice processes included in the GoU’s peace building efforts point 
to a comprehensive justice framework that once and for all would allow Uganda to move from 
a situation of relative stability (negative peace) towards a situation of national reconciliation 
and positive peace. In reality, however, the implementation of the mechanisms appears to lack 
genuine political and financial support from the GoU to meet the grievances of its people and 
address the root causes of the conflict. Violence might to some degree be absent currently, but 
the relative stability is unlikely to continue if the structural inequalities are not dealt with leav-
ing the people with the LRA as a likely tool through which to express their grievances. 
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